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Constitutionalizing Consumer Financial 
Protection: The Case for the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau 
Hosea H. Harvey† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Since its inception, the imminent death of the Consumer Fi-
nancial Protection Bureau (CFPB or Bureau) has been as exag-
gerated as the (first) death of Mark Twain.1 The Bureau,2 part 
of Congress’s response to the 2008 financial crisis, is an inde-
pendent executive agency responsible for consumer financial 
protection.3 The CFPB attempts to “regulate[]  the offering and 
provision of consumer financial products [and] services,” while 
 
†  Associate Professor of Law, Temple University, Beasley School of Law. 
Special thanks to the Minnesota Law Review for an excellent symposium. In 
addition, appreciation is extended to the Association of American Law Schools 
(AALS) Section on Commercial & Related Consumer Law and the AALS Section 
on Creditors’ and Debtors’ Rights for selecting the paper for presentation at the 
2019 AALS Annual Meeting. The author thanks Jane Baron, Hank Chambers, 
Rick Greenstein, Aman McLeod, Lauren Ouziel, Lauren Sudeall, and Rory Van 
Loo for feedback on earlier drafts. Copyright © 2019 by Hosea H. Harvey. 
 1. Frank Marshall White, Mark Twain Amused: Humorist Says He Even 
Heard on Good Authority that He Was Dead, N.Y.J. (June 2, 1897), https://cdn 
.loc.gov/service/sgp/sgpbatches/batch_dlc_delancey_ver02/data/sn83030180/ 
print2444/1897060201/0181.pdf. Mark Twain’s off-misquoted letter reads: 
“James Ross Clemens, of St. Louis, a cousin of mine, was seriously ill two or 
three weeks ago in London, but is well now. The report of my illness grew out of 
his illness. The report of my death was an exaggeration.” Id. 
 2. Hereinafter, I refer to the Bureau under its most well-known colloquial 
moniker, CFPB, rather than the Bureau’s “official legal name.” See, e.g., Kathy 
Kraninger (@CFPBDirector), TWITTER (Dec. 19, 2018, 12:48 PM), https://twitter 
.com/CFPBDirector/status/1075493112418570240 (exploring the Bureau’s on-
going dialogue about its legal name versus its branded name). 
 3. 156 CONG. REC. 9839 (2010) (statement of Rep. Holt); see also About Us, 
CFPB, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us (last visited April 14, 2019). 
The Bureau’s genesis is described best by Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren. 
See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
1 (2008). 
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ensuring that consumers are empowered to “make better in-
formed financial decisions.”4 The CFPB’s design-features were 
needed, in part, to consolidate regulatory authority and other 
functions from numerous other federal regulatory agencies.5 
Furthermore, because its design-features include insulation 
from congressional appropriation review and for-cause executive 
removal power, the agency is largely protected from outside in-
fluence, except perhaps during the nomination process of its sin-
gular director.6 The Bureau has been the subject of many cri-
tiques—political and legal, empirical and anecdotal—about each 
and every part of its operations, spanning employment deci-
sions,7 the recess appointment power,8 the validity of a five-
member structure,9 its ability to regulate certain industries10 or 
 
 4. About Us, supra note 3. 
 5. Megan Slack, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 101: Why We Need 
a Consumer Watchdog, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 4, 2012), https://obamawhitehouse 
.achives.gov/blog/2012/01/04/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-101-why 
-we-need-consumer-watchdog. 
 6. Congress generally controls agency budget reviews, and that relation-
ship can be understood to give Congress substantive authority over the agency. 
The CFPB operates within the Federal Reserve and is not required to submit to 
congressional budget allocation review. The CFPB was also created with a pro-
vision restricting the President’s removal power over the Director to only situa-
tions where just-cause exists, limiting executive influence. 12 U.S.C.  
§ 5491(c)(3) (2012) (“The President may remove the Director for inefficiency, ne-
glect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”). The Director of the CFPB serves a five-
year term and must be nominated by the President and approved by the Senate. 
Id. § 5491(b)–(c) (outlining the term and nomination process of the Director).  
 7. See Class Action Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, Jones v. Mul-
vaney, No. 18-2132 (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2018) (commencing a class action com-
plaint against the CFPB’s internal employment practices); see also Barbara S. 
Mishkin, Director Cordray to Testify at July 30 House Hearing on Alleged CFPB 
Employee Discrimination, BALLARD SPAHR (July 28, 2014), https://www 
.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2014/07/28/director-cordray-to-testify-at-july-30 
-house-hearing-on-alleged-cfpb-employee-discrimination. 
 8. See, e.g., CFPB v. Gordon, 819 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2016) (challenging 
the CFPB’s enforcement power under improper recess appointments); see also 
Barbara Mishkin, Director Cordray Ratifies Pre-Confirmation Actions, BAL-
LARD SPAHR (Aug. 30, 2013), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2013/ 
08/30/director-cordray-ratifies-pre-confirmation-actions. 
 9. The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection’s Unconstitutional De-
sign: Hearing Before H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations, 155th Cong. 
5–8 (2017) (statement of Adam J. White, Research Fellow, The Hoover Insti-
tute), https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/03.21.2017_adam_ 
white_testimony.pdf.  
 10. Kit Addleman & Billy Marsh, Auto Finance Companies Now Subject to 
CFPB Supervisory Authority, HAYNES BOONE (July 14, 2015), http://www 
.haynesboone.com/Alerts/auto-finance-companies-now-subject-to-cfpb.  
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certain financial products,11 privacy considerations,12 and a host 
of other concerns, such as whether its actions reduce access to 
credit or financial products.13 These concerns appear motivated 
by an array of ideological and legal considerations. But, perhaps 
these concerns arose because the Bureau was remarkably effec-
tive at its inception and engaged in regulatory practices that 
threatened entrenched bureaucratic interests and industry 
stakeholders.14 It also appears to have been an effective advocate 
for racial justice, promoting both credit access and anti-discrim-
ination principles,15 something its critics may have found prob-
lematic. 
 
 11. Astra Taylor, Why It’s So Hard to Regulate Payday Lenders, NEW 
YORKER (Aug. 6, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/why-its 
-so-hard-to-regulate-payday-lenders.  
 12. James Shreve, CFPB Final Rule Cuts Costs and Headaches from An-
nual Privacy Notices, THOMPSON COBURN (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www 
.thompsoncoburn.com/insights/blogs/cybersecurity-bits-and-bytes/post/2018-08 
-21/cfpb-final-rule-cuts-costs-and-headaches-from-annual-privacy-notices. 
 13. Todd Zywicki, The CFPB Could Be a Force for Good, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 
19, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-cfpb-could-be-a-force-for-good 
-1519070012?mod=djkeyword&tesla=y; see also Todd Zywicki, The Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or Menace?, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 
856 (2013) (“The CFPB’s structure virtually guarantees the manifestation of 
those pathologies in practice: excessive risk aversion, agency imperialism, and 
tunnel vision.”). For a reflective review of these critiques and others, see Todd 
J. Zywicki, The Dodd-Frank Act Five Years Later: Are We More Stable? (Geo. 
Mason L. Studies Res. Paper No. LS 15-10, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract 
=2651942 (utilizing author’s Congressional testimony about the status of con-
sumer financial protection efforts). 
 14. See, e.g., Leonard J. Kennedy et al., The Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau: Financial Regulation for the Twenty-First Century, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 
1141 (2012); see also Christopher Lewis Peterson, Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau Law Enforcement: An Empirical Review, 90 TUL. L. REV. 1057 
(2016) (evaluating CFPB’s track record for enforcing financial protection laws); 
Gretchen Morgenson, The Watchdog Protecting Consumers May Be Too Effec-
tive, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/business/ 
consumer-financial-protection-bureau-gretchen-morgenson.html (detailing de-
bates on effectiveness and success of CFPB enforcement actions). 
 15. See, e.g., Press Release, CFPB, CFPB and DOJ Take Action Against 
National City Bank for Discriminatory Mortgage Pricing (Dec. 23, 2013), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-and-doj-take-action 
-against-national-city-bank-for-discriminatory-mortgage-pricing (announcing 
CFPB’s $35 million settlement of complaint against National City Bank “for 
charging higher prices on mortgage loans to African-American and Hispanic 
borrowers than similarly creditworthy white borrowers between the years 2002 
and 2008”); see also Press Release, CFPB, CFPB and DOJ Order Hudson City 
Bank to Pay $27 Million to Increase Mortgage Credit Access in Communities 
Illegally Redlined (Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/ 
newsroom/cfpb-and-doj-order-hudson-city-savings-bank-to-pay-27-million-to 
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These voluminous critiques and robust defenses of the Bu-
reau have, however, bypassed a more foundational question: 
whether the CFPB’s structure and design are consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence. Though many re-
cent cases have raised the constitutional question, it has been 
underdeveloped in legal scholarship. Reviewing the totality of 
such cases provides a framework for understanding—and ulti-
mately rejecting—the constitutional concerns of its critics. 
The CFPB’s constitutional critics argue that: (1) Article II’s 
Take Care and Appointments Clauses (Sections 2 and 3) and the 
Supreme Court’s prior precedents require independent commis-
sions and agencies to have a five-member form to satisfy the Su-
preme Court’s prior agency jurisprudence; (2) the novelty of the 
CFPB’s structure is presumptively unconstitutional absent clear 
historical precedent that agencies are routinely structured this 
way; (3) the accrued power in the CFPB’s director violates Arti-
cle II because the President has limited removal power over the 
Director; (4) the Director’s accrued powers are a grave, general 
threat to personal liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution, be-
cause other branches of government cannot exercise sufficient 
control over the CFPB’s actions, violating the principle of sepa-
ration of powers; and more subversively, (5) independent agen-
cies should all be found to be unconstitutional because they re-
strict the President’s ability to faithfully execute the laws or 
violate separation of powers principles. Much of these critiques 
can be collapsed into the brusque conclusion of one such critic, 
then-D.C. Circuit Judge Kavanaugh: “[T]he CFPB is unconstitu-
tionally structured because it is an independent agency headed 
by a single Director.”16 
Between 2016 and 2018, these aforementioned alleged con-
stitutional infirmities were argued in a variety of courts, but al-
most every court found them unpersuasive or insufficient to de-
clare the CFPB’s structure unconstitutional.17 The most direct 
 
-increase-mortgage-credit-access-in-communities-illegally-redlined (announc-
ing CFPB’s settlement with Hudson City Savings Bank for “$27 Million to In-
crease Mortgage Credit Access in Communities Illegally Redlined”). 
 16. PHH Corp. v. CFPB (PHH-1), No. 15-1177, slip op. at 36 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 
11, 2016) (vacated). 
 17. Courts have consistently held that the CFPB structure is constitu-
tional. See CFPB v. Think Fin., LLC, No. CV-17-127-GF-BMM, 2018 WL 
3707911, at *2 (D. Mont. Aug. 3, 2018); CFPB v. All Am. Check Cashing, Inc., 
No. 3:16-CV-356-WHB-JCG, at *2–4 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 27, 2018) (holding the 
CFPB structure as constitutional with interlocutory appeal on constitutional 
question granted Mar. 27, 2018); CFPB v. Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc., 
No. 15-CV-2106-RS, 2017 WL 3948396, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2017), appeal 
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and engaged constitutional challenge, PHH v. CFPB, first pro-
duced a divided D.C. Circuit panel decision (PHH-1) that found 
the CFPB’s structure unconstitutional,18 then a divided en banc 
decision (PHH-2) that found otherwise.19 But, on June 8, 2018, 
Director Mick Mulvaney dismissed the underlying enforcement 
action in PHH-2.20 
Although nothing is ever certain in the certiorari process, let 
me make a bold prediction: the constitutional challenge to the 
CFPB will soon reach the Supreme Court.21 And, there is reason 
 
docketed, No. 18-15431 (9th Cir. Mar. 15, 2018); CFPB v. TCF Nat’l Bank, No. 
17-166 (RHK/DTS), 2017 WL 6211033, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 8, 2017); CFPB v. 
Seila Law, LLC, No. 8:17-CV-01081-JLS-JEM, 2017 WL 6536586, at *1 (C.D. 
Cal. Aug. 25, 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-56324 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 2017); 
CFPB v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-CV-101, 2017 WL 3380530, at *1 (M.D. Pa. 
Aug. 4, 2017); CFPB v. Future Income Payments, LLC, 252 F. Supp. 3d 961 
(C.D. Cal. 2017), stayed pending appeal, No. 17-55721, 2017 WL 2622774 (9th 
Cir. June 1, 2017); CFPB v. NDG Fin. Corp., No. 15-CV-5211 (CM), 2016 WL 
7188792, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2016), reconsideration denied, No. 15-CV-5211 
(CM), 2016 WL 7742784 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2016); CFPB v. CashCall, Inc., No. 
CV-15-7522-JFW-RAOx, 2016 WL 4820635, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2016), ap-
peal filed, No. 18-55479, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 12, 2018); CFPB v. ITT Educ. Servs., 
Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 878 (S.D. Ind. 2015), appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdic-
tion, No.15-1761, 2016 WL 9447163, at *1 (7th Cir. 2016); CFPB v. Frederick J. 
Hanna & Assocs., 114 F. Supp. 3d 1342 (N.D. Ga. 2015); CFPB v. Morgan 
Drexen, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2014). But see CFPB v. RD Legal 
Funding, No. 17-CV-890 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2018) (presently on appeal); 
CFPB v. D&D Mktg., No. 2:15-CV-09692, 2016 WL 8849698, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 
Nov. 17, 2016), interlocutory appeal granted, No. 17-55709, 2017 WL 597428 
(9th Cir. May 17, 2017) (including an initial finding that the CFPB is unconsti-
tutional). Both of these two cases rely on PHH-1 for their analysis. 
 18. See PHH-1, slip op. 
 19. PHH Corp, v. CFPB (PHH-2), No. 15-177, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Jan. 31, 
2018) (en banc).  
 20. See In the Matter of PHH Corp., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0002 (2018) (or-
dering dismissal of underlying charges in PHH-2 at the request of Acting CFPB 
Director Mulvaney). 
 21. Court practitioners and academics have settled on a number of reasons 
that make cert more likely for any case, chief among them: divisions between 
lower courts (particularly between circuits), an issue of nationwide importance, 
and a misapplication of Supreme Court precedent. All of these are arguably pre-
sent with respect to the CFPB’s constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Diane L. 
McGimsey & Judson O. Littleton, Expert Q&A on Seeking or Opposing Certio-
rari in the U.S. Supreme Court, THOMSON REUTERS: PRAC. L. (2018), https:// 
www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/McGimsey_Littleton_Practical_Law_ 
Certiorari_Supreme_Court_2018.pdf (discussing cert grant factors). And, in 
January and March 2019, respectively, two courts evaluating challenges to the 
CFPB on constitutional grounds heard oral arguments. See CFPB v. Seila Law, 
LLC, No. 8:17-CV-01081-JLS-JEM, 2017 WL 6536586 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2017), 
appeal docketed, No. 17-56324 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 2017); see also CFPB v. All Am. 
Check Cashing, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-356-WHB-JCG (5th Cir. 2019). 
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for the CFPB’s advocates to be concerned over the Court’s re-
sponse. The chief constitutional critic of the CFPB happens to be 
newly appointed Justice Brett Kavanaugh, who authored PHH-
1 and vigorously dissented in PHH-2.22 Further, some scholars 
and judges have suggested a recent Supreme Court case, Free 
Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board (Free 
Enterprise),23 discussed below, indicates that the Court may now 
welcome a wholesale revision to its Article II jurisprudence, con-
sistent with Justice Kavanaugh’s broad approach. So, despite a 
hundred years of executive agency jurisprudence, which could 
(or should) have provided clarity, the continued existence of the 
CFPB is an open constitutional question. Therefore, in the midst 
of a national debate about the CFPB’s effectiveness and legiti-
macy, with at least one Supreme Court Justice convinced of its 
constitutional failings, and a symposium dedicated to reflecting 
on Dodd-Frank ten years later, now is an ideal time to situate 
the CFPB within the Supreme Court’s 100 years of executive 
agency jurisprudence. Further, constitutional attacks on the 
CFPB should also worry those who value the federal govern-
ment’s ability to create and sustain independent administrative 
agencies that are free from congressional and executive control 
in turbulent political times. 
This Article proceeds as follows. First, the Article traces a 
history of the Supreme Court’s executive agency jurisprudence 
and outlines a framework to understand where the Bureau is 
situated in relation to prior precedents. Next, the Article focuses 
on reframing the debate by situating the CFPB’s constitutional-
ity within the foundational executive agency case, Humphrey’s 
Executor. Following that, it analyzes the D.C. Circuit’s dual opin-
ions in PHH-1 and PHH-2, focusing on defending the CFPB from 
its legal critics. Concluding briefly, for reasons different than 
many of its critics, the Article calls for a revision to the CFPB’s 
structure by changing to the five-member commissioner struc-
ture common among other regulatory agencies. Switching to a 
five-member commission may also solve, in part, any remaining 
open questions surrounding the constitutionality of the Bureau’s 
structure, notwithstanding that it already survives constitu-
tional muster. Further, the CFPB will be more effective in its 
 
 22. See, e.g., Emily Stewart, Consumer Advocacy Groups Are Extremely 
Worried About Brett Kavanaugh, VOX (July 11, 2018), https://www.vox.com/ 
policy-and-politics/2018/7/11/17556120/brett-kavanaugh-elizabeth-warren-cfpb 
-regulations. 
 23. 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
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mission for many reasons, including one often ignored by propo-
nents and critics: a five-member commission structure is more 
likely to be comprised of a diversity of voices, which will lead to 
a broader and more inclusive perspective on the Bureau’s mis-
sion, because, in part, it will more accurately reflect the diversity 
of the consumer marketplace that the CFPB regulates.24 
I.  100 YEARS OF SOLITUDE: INDEPENDENT AGENCIES 
AND THE CONSTITUTION   
The roots of the CFPB’s constitutional crisis began more 
than a century ago. The Smithsonian Institution and the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, two of the earliest independent ex-
ecutive agencies, were formed in the mid-1800s.25 The trend of 
distributing power and responsibility to “independent” govern-
ment agencies operating outside of the traditional three-branch 
structure accelerated through the 1930s as President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt and his New Deal sought to enhance federal 
power. The trend was effectuated through numerous govern-
ment-sponsored programs, administered through bureaucratic 
agencies, and regulated through others.26 
Independent executive agencies differ from traditional exec-
utive agencies in a few ways, but for our purposes—most im-
portantly—their agency heads are not typically subject to the at-
will presidential removal power, which is derived from Article II 
and Supreme Court interpretations of the Article’s limits.27 
 
 24. See, e.g., David A. Carter et al., Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, 
and Firm Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33 (2003) (examining the relationship between 
board diversity and a company’s firm value for the Fortune 1000 group of com-
panies).  
 25. Interstate Commerce Commission, FED. REG., https://www.federalregis 
ter.gov/agencies/interstate-commerce-commission (last visited April 14, 2019) 
(noting the Interstate Commerce Commission was the first regulatory commis-
sion in U.S. history and was established in the 1880s); Our Organization, 
SMITHSONIAN, https://www.si.edu/about/administration (last visited April 14, 
2019) (noting that the Smithsonian Institution was established by Congress in 
1846). 
 26. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1933–1945, 
LIBR. CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/ 
presentationsandactivities/presentations/timeline/depwwii/newdeal (last vis-
ited April 14, 2019); see also JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 
70 (1966). 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. (“He shall have Power, by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Sena-
tors present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United 
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Scholars and courts agree that Article II, Section II provides for 
a robust appointment power—and thus an inherent removal 
power. But while acknowledging that Section III requires that 
the President “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”28 
they disagree intensely about the broad contours of each Section, 
particularly when applied to independent agencies. Since part of 
ensuring faithful execution of the laws must involve the ability 
to remove senior agency political appointees to ensure consistent 
application of the law, a broad argument for presidential power 
under Article II suggests that Congress may not place limits on 
the President’s ability to remove appointees who serve in an ex-
ecutive capacity and are approved by the Senate. 
Thus, the history of constitutional challenges relevant to in-
dependent agencies like the CFPB rests on a constitutional anal-
ysis that is both fixed and evolving. Earlier cases like Humph-
rey’s Executor,29 discussed below, wrestled with broader 
questions of agency design and whether the Constitution permit-
ted independent agencies to exist at all, absent a clear home for 
them within one of the three branches of government. Earlier 
and later cases also confronted Article II questions—namely, 
whether the executive’s responsibility to faithfully execute the 
law or the executive’s appointment power were encroached upon 
by the relevant agency’s design or by Congress eliminating the 
President’s power to remove political appointees. Some later 
cases bypassed the design question to focus more squarely on the 
type of removal provision and whether the absence or presence 
of certain removal terms was inconsistent with Article II. When 
an unconstitutional structure was found, these cases looked next 
at what the appropriate remedy would be—either the removal of 
the impermissible restriction, or the invalidation of the entire 
 
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which 
shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appoint-
ment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in 
the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 
(“He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the 
Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge 
necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both 
Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with 
Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he 
shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he 
shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all 
the Officers of the United States.”). 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 29. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
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agency. Though not universally agreed upon, it is generally ac-
cepted that Humphrey’s is still the primary authority on both 
questions—subject to the interpretation of how later cases 
change the removal analysis and the remedy. Therefore, it is 
useful to situate this framework within the evolving line of inde-
pendent agency jurisprudence, which begins with Myers v. 
United States. 
A. MYERS AND HUMPHREY’S—THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORK 
The first Supreme Court case to address the constitutional-
ity of an independent agency’s structure focused on whether the 
President could remove an agency’s head at will despite good-
cause restrictions.30 In Myers, the President directed that Post-
master Frank S. Myers be terminated before his term was fin-
ished.31 Myers contended that there had been no good cause for 
his removal and that the removal was thus invalid.32 The Myers 
Court held that the President had the power to remove, for any 
reason, any postmaster he had appointed with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, without regard to “cause.”33 The Myers 
Court relied on the power of removal inherent in the general Ar-
ticle II appointment power and determined that any condition 
that stopped the President from utilizing his full constitutional 
powers to see the law faithfully executed was unconstitutional.34 
Nine years after Myers, Humphrey’s substantially refined 
the scope of the executive power of removal, specifically in the 
context of independent agency constitutionality.35 The Humph-
rey’s decision arose out of President Roosevelt’s attempt to re-
move William Humphrey, a Commissioner of the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC or Commission), shortly after the President 
took office.36 The Humphrey’s Court reviewed provisions of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) to evaluate whether 
its design was constitutional and whether the “for-cause” re-
moval restrictions for FTC Commissioners unduly restricted or 
 
 30. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106–08 (1926). 
 31. Id. Myers was a Senate-confirmed “first-class” Postmaster in Oregon 
and was removed by the Postmaster General at the direction of the President 
prior to the expiration of his term. Id. at 106. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 163–64. 
 34. Id. at 163–66. 
 35. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
 36. Id. at 618–19. 
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limited President Roosevelt’s Article II powers.37 The Humph-
rey’s Court then determined that the FTC Act did indeed restrict 
the presidential power of removal because it required one or 
more specified causes to justify removal.38 The Court, using a 
four-part analysis, nonetheless held that these provisions, be-
cause of the agency’s design features and independence, were 
constitutionally valid.39 The four-part “Humphrey’s Test” for de-
termining an agency’s constitutional “independence” asks 
whether the agency: (1) is nonpartisan; (2) deals with uniquely 
expert subject matter or skills; and engages in duties which func-
tion as either (3) quasi-judicial or (4) quasi-legislative tasks.40 
The Court thus effectively required that an initial inquiry into 
whether an “independent” government agency is constitutional 
should begin with the four-part framework prior to and separate 
from determining whether an official’s removal process violates 
Article II. 
Humphrey’s and Myers considered similar factual scenarios 
regarding the President’s power to remove the head of an execu-
tive agency, but diverged in defining the scope of that power.41 
Whereas the reasoning in Myers favored an unrestricted view of 
the executive power of removal regardless of the commission’s 
character, Humphrey’s, while not overruling Myers directly, de-
clined to recognize a broad and unlimited Article II executive re-
moval power.42 Instead, the Court in Humphrey’s drew a distinc-
tion between the wholly executive functions of the postmaster 
involved in Myers, and the quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial 
hybrid functions of the Commissioner of the FTC. Meaning, its 
validation of the FTC’s design and independence mitigated some 
Article II concerns.43 Humphrey’s has since been interpreted to 
mean that the President may not remove independent agency 
commissioners for political reasons. Rather, he is restricted to 
instances where there is good cause (defined as “inefficiency, ne-
glect of duty, or malfeasance in office”).44  
Ten years later, in Wiener v. United States, the Court clari-
fied that Humphrey’s, not Myers, remained the appropriate 
 
 37. Id. at 619. 
 38. Id. at 626. 
 39. Id. at 627–31. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See id. at 618–19; Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106–08 (1926). 
 42. See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 627–31; Myers, 272 U.S. at 163–66. 
 43. See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 629. The Commissioner of the FTC 
was responsible for adjudicatory duties. Id. 
 44. Id. 
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benchmark.45 The Court narrowly confined the scope of the My-
ers decision to include only “purely executive officers” like the 
postmaster and held that the Court “‘disapproved’ the expres-
sions in Myers supporting the President’s inherent constitu-
tional power to remove members of quasi-judicial bodies.”46 In 
short, Wiener clarifies that if an independent agency’s design en-
gages multiple functions pursuant to the Humphrey’s framework 
and if Congress’s intent regarding removal is clear, agency head 
removal restrictions are constitutionally sound.47 
B. THE HALF-CENTURY CASES: BOWSHER AND MORRISON 
A half-century after Humphrey’s, the Reagan Administra-
tion’s anti-regulatory agenda necessitated that it, first, vigor-
ously defend the executive’s Article II powers and, second, ask 
the Supreme Court to finally find independent agencies uncon-
stitutional.48 The administration’s arguments somewhat shifted 
the nature of the inquiry from the Humphrey’s test’s four parts 
to the specific position of the agency head within the hierarchy; 
namely, whether he or she is a principal officer or an inferior 
officer subject to the President’s control.49 This is important be-
cause, per the Appointments Clause, the President is charged 
with appointment, and, by implication, removal, of all principal 
officers of the United States. Conversely, inferior officers can be 
appointed by Congress, a congressional delegation of power to 
the President, or a department head.50 If an agency’s removal or 
appointment process does not comport with the Appointments 
Clause, that process is unconstitutional because it either raises 
Article II concerns or implicates separation of powers principles. 
The Reagan Administration’s opportunity to challenge 
Humphrey’s came in Bowsher v. Synar, where provisions of the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 em-
powering the Comptroller General to prepare and submit a re-
port detailing deficit reductions for a fiscal year were challenged 
 
 45. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958). 
 46. Id. at 352. 
 47. Id. at 353–54. 
 48. See infra notes 51–72 and accompanying text. The administration’s ac-
tions during a Congressional investigation, pursuant to the counsel of Office of 
Legal Counsel head Ted Olson, also led to another landmark (but oft-critiqued) 
executive power case, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). This case is dis-
cussed infra notes 58–72 and accompanying text.  
 49. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 672–77; Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 718–24 
(1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120–29 (1976). 
 50. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 672–77. 
  
2440 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:2429 
 
as unconstitutional.51 Only Congress was able to remove the 
Comptroller General, and only by impeachment or through a 
joint resolution due to good cause.52 Responsibility for execution 
of the Act was reserved to the Comptroller General while Con-
gress retained ultimate control over that execution.53 Because of 
these provisions, the Justice Department made two arguments: 
first, that Congress could not grant itself removal power over an 
executive officer; and second, that the President must have the 
power to remove the Comptroller General at will because he per-
forms executive functions.54 The second of these arguments’ suc-
cess would have been considered a major victory for the Reagan 
Administration, and would have reinvigorated Myers for the first 
time in over fifty years. 
Instead, the Bowsher Court determined that the Comptrol-
ler General had been unconstitutionally delegated executive 
powers because Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of 
removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws, 
other than through impeachment.55 While acknowledging that 
Congress cannot delegate itself power to remove an executive of-
ficer, the Court declined to hold that the President must have 
unrestrained removal power over all executive officers.56 In so 
ruling, the Humphrey’s “for-cause” analysis was largely rein-
forced as precedent.57 
In Morrison, the Assistant Attorney General for the Office 
of Legal Counsel (Ted Olson) sued an independent counsel who 
had been given authority to investigate whether the attorney 
general violated federal law.58 Olson argued that the Office took 
executive powers away from the President and assigned them to 
a fourth branch of government that was not answerable to any-
one, implicating Article II and separation of powers principles.59 
But the Court held that the independent counsel provision of the 
Act did not violate separation of powers principles because alt-
hough the President’s removal power was restrained, the re-
straint did not cause power to flow to another branch.60 Although 
 
 51. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 719. 
 52. Id. at 720. 
 53. Id. at 732–33. 
 54. Id. at 719–21. 
 55. Id. at 726. 
 56. Id. at 760 (White, J., dissenting). 
 57. See id. at 739–40. 
 58. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 665–69 (1988). 
 59. Id. at 660. 
 60. Id. at 673–77. 
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the independent counsel had discretion to disagree with the at-
torney general and ultimately prevent executive control, which 
may seem to imply the individual is a principal officer, the Act 
implied the agency head sits in a relatively inferior position be-
cause it authorized the attorney general to remove the counsel.61 
Furthermore, because the nature of the duties performed by the 
independent counsel was largely investigative, and the duration 
of those duties was limited and defined, they did not qualify as 
quasi-legislative under a Humphrey’s analysis.62 
The Morrison Court determined that an inferior officer, as 
categorized by the Appointments Clause, possesses the following 
three characteristics: that officer (1) is subject to removal by a 
higher executive branch official; (2) is empowered by the Act to 
perform only certain, limited duties; and (3) holds an office that 
is limited in jurisdiction and limited in tenure.63 When analyzing 
the principal/inferior officer distinction using the Morrison 
standard, if an individual agency head meets all three of the re-
quirements, that person is an inferior officer whose appoint-
ment—and thus removal—is not solely within the purview of the 
executive branch.64 Conversely, if an agency head fails to meet 
any of the prongs, the person/position is a principal officer.65 
The Morrison Court also rejected the argument that the 
good-cause protections were unconstitutional infringements on 
the President’s power.66 The Court dismissed the view that the 
use of executive power itself prohibits Congress from prescribing 
good-cause removal qualifications.67 In this regard, the Court 
questioned the basis for earlier decisions in Myers and Humph-
rey’s that whether the officer must be removable at will turned 
solely on whether the agency was responsible for purely execu-
tive duties or those of a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial na-
ture.68 Instead, the Court found the key question to be whether 
“the removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede 
the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty.”69 
When the Court applied this test, it found that in practice it was 
 
 61. Id. at 670–72. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 671–72. 
 64. Id. at 671–74. 
 65. Id. at 671–73. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 688–90. 
 69. Id. at 690. 
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unlikely that good-cause restrictions would significantly inhibit 
the President’s ability to see the law faithfully executed.70 In do-
ing this, the Morrison Court somewhat weakened its decision by 
reasoning that there remained ample authority for the executive 
to ensure subordinate officers were competent. While maintain-
ing the constitutionality of independent agencies, the just-cause 
provisions now must be interpreted to leave the President signif-
icant power to terminate and influence those whom the provi-
sions protect.71 Later cases, including Buckley and Mistretta, 
have raised Article II and separation of powers concerns, though 
neither applies directly to the CFPB’s present predicament.72 
C. THE LATEST WRINKLE—FREE ENTERPRISE 
The most recent iteration of this constitutional discourse 
about Article II removal power involves the complexity of a re-
moval power restriction.73 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act created the 
five-member Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) to improve accounting oversight and authorized the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) to select the PCAOB 
board members.74 In Free Enterprise, a nonprofit organization 
and an accounting firm claimed that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act de-
fied both separation of powers principles and the Appointments 
Clause in how it structured the PCAOB’s removal process.75 The 
PCAOB board members were separated from the President’s 
reach by two degrees: first through the inclusion of a for-cause 
removal provision, and second, by vesting decision-making 
power for removal in the SEC, rather than in the President.76 
The Supreme Court held that the dual for-cause limitations on 
removal were constitutionally infirm because they ultimately 
 
 70. Id. at 691–92. 
 71. See id. 
 72. Buckley’s Article II analysis revolved around limitations on the Presi-
dent’s appointment power, not the removal power. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1 (1976). Mistretta’s analysis centered in part on finding a non-delegation 
of Congressional power, an issue not present with respect to the CFPB. See Mis-
tretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 362, 371–80 (1989). 
 73. See generally Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 
561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
 74. More broadly, the PCAOB’s mission is “to oversee the audits of public 
companies . . . in order to protect investors and further the public interest in the 
preparation of informative, accurate, and independent audit reports.” See Mis-
sion, Vision, and Values, PCAOB, https://pcaobus.org/About/History/Pages/ 
mission-vision-values.aspx (last visited April 14, 2019). 
 75. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 487. 
 76. Id. at 484–87. 
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prohibited the President from controlling subservient executive 
officers.77 
Free Enterprise offered the most extensive discussion of 
presidential power over the structure of administrative agencies 
since Myers. It held that the relationship between the President, 
the SEC, and the PCAOB was inconsistent with the President’s 
Article II powers.78 In doing so, the Court did not rely on any of 
the common reasons used in past decisions for determining 
whether an agency’s design features were unconstitutional. 
Whereas in earlier cases only one level of good-cause protec-
tion separated the President from removing the individual of-
ficer, Free Enterprise reasoned that a second degree of separa-
tion, which resulted in the President not being able to decide 
whether the requisite cause exists, is unconstitutional because 
it effectively removes the President from direct influence over 
removal altogether.79 In the earlier cases in which agency struc-
ture was deemed constitutional, a single layer of separation had 
existed where the President—or a subordinate that he could re-
move at will—could judge conduct to determine if good cause ex-
isted for removal.80 The second layer, in its obstruction of the 
executive’s Article II duty to see that the law be faithfully exe-
cuted, is unconstitutional.81 The primary issue was not that Con-
gress retained too much control (as in Bowsher), but rather that 
it did not provide the President enough control.82 
Thus, the constitutional issue with the PCAOB did not 
emerge merely because a good-cause provision existed. Rather, 
it was the addition of the second inhibiting provision that further 
removed the President from the decision-making process.83 
While a single level of protection still allows the President to 
make a good-cause assessment, the vesting of the judgment pro-
cess outside the direct control of the executive leaves the Presi-
dent helpless and unable to intervene.84 Although able to review 
the outside agency’s good-cause decision, his opinion would be 
meaningless unless the good-cause determination made was a 
 
 77. Id. at 492. 
 78. Id. at 495. 
 79. Id. at 501. 
 80. Id. at 494–96. 
 81. Id. at 490–92. 
 82. Id. at 513–14. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 495–97. 
  
2444 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:2429 
 
gross neglect of duty.85 Thus, even without Congress delegating 
removal power or appointment power to itself, or retaining a veto 
power over the agencies’ actions, the PCAOB’s design was un-
constitutional.86 However, even after deeming the dual for-cause 
limitations to contravene the Constitution’s separation of pow-
ers, Free Enterprise determined the restrictions to be severable 
from the statute and the remainder enforceable.87 
The holding of Free Enterprise did not concern the novelty of 
the administrative design (the structure itself) , but rather 
whether the removal structure contravened the Constitution by 
substantially burdening the President in meeting his Article II 
charge to see that the law is faithfully executed.88 Instead of the 
usual issue in constitutional removal challenges—Congress 
vesting removal power in itself—Free Enterprise involved vest-
ing the remaining removal power in a separate body, an agency 
that was not compelled to follow the position urged by the Pres-
ident.89 But a removal or design feature can be new or atypical 
while still enabling the President to meet all of his constitutional 
obligations. While novelty can theoretically be weighed as a 
small component of the constitutional analysis, it should not 
supplant accepted precedent as the primary determinant. This 
is true for a number of reasons, and therefore “legislative novelty 
is not evidence and should not be used as evidence that a statute 
is unconstitutional on federalism or separation-of-powers 
grounds.”90 
Seeing Free Enterprise as a long overdue redemption of My-
ers is misguided. Free Enterprise represents an outer limit, set-
ting a specific, appropriate boundary for how much Congress can 
limit the President’s removal powers beyond “for cause.”91 Fur-
ther, the unusual relationship design among the President, the 
 
 85. Id. at 496–97. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 510–25. 
 88. Id. at 483–84. 
 89. See id. Vesting in a separate non-branch body is different than earlier 
Supreme Court cases where the removal power remained within the legislative 
branch or one of its agents. Whereas those cases highlighted that Congress re-
taining power intended for the executive was unconstitutional, Free Enterprise 
instead focused on the lack of power that remained with the President. See gen-
erally id. 
 90. Leah M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 DUKE L.J. 1407, 1412 
(2017) (tracing the rise of the statutory-novelty-is-presumptively-constitution-
ally-bad jurisprudence and concluding that courts’ more frequent invocations of 
novelty as proof of unconstitutionality lack evidence). 
 91. Free Enterprise is applicable in the rare instance where the agency head 
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SEC, and the PCAOB should prevent widespread adoption of its 
holding as applied to the CFPB.92 Because the structure of the 
agency-design at issue in Free Enterprise (the PCAOB) was ex-
tremely unusual, that case’s holding is limited to a narrow set of 
circumstances centered on the double-burdened removal 
power.93 The CFPB, and every other independent agency that is 
subject to removal restrictions, vests the remaining power in the 
President alone.94 Thus, the CFPB, the Federal Reserve, and the 
President have a sufficiently dissimilar relationship from that 
present in Free Enterprise.95 Two layers of separation for re-
moval is not the same as one.96 No independent agency head, 
including the Director of the CFPB, is afforded as much protec-
tion from Presidential oversight as was true in Free Enterprise, 
and thus the case’s application to the CFPB is particularly sus-
pect. 
D. FROM HUMPHREY’S TO FREE ENTERPRISE—THE UNITARY 
EXECUTIVE FRAMEWORK 
The aforementioned post-Humphrey’s cases have at their 
core one fundamental philosophical principle embedded within 
an Article II constitutional lens. Much of the critique of inde-
pendent agencies from Humphrey’s to Free Enterprise centers 
around a scholarly approach called the unified or unitary execu-
tive model and determining whether the Supreme Court’s 
agency jurisprudence discussed above is consistent with that ap-
proach.97 Within that tradition, scholars argue that the Consti-
tution demands that the executive branch should be recognized 
as a large, bureaucratic institution that recognizes the chief ex-
ecutive as sitting at the top of that institution. Like any corpora-
tion, the organizational structure of a unitary executive would 
 
in question is beyond direct presidential control by multiple layers. Free Enter. 
Fund, 561 U.S. at 547. 
 92. Id. at 478–90. 
 93. See id. at 483–92. 
 94. The President can remove the Director for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, 
or malfeasance in office.” 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2012). 
 95. See, e.g., Hans Bader, Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB: Narrow Sepa-
ration-of-Powers Ruling Illustrates That the Supreme Court Is Not “Pro-Busi-
ness”, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 269 (2010), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/ 
serials/files/supreme-courtreview/2010/9/bader-pcaob_0.pdf. 
 96. See id. at 277. 
 97. See Morton Rosenberg, Whatever Happened to Congressional Review of 
Agency Rulemaking: A Brief Overview, Assessment, and Proposal for Reform, 51 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1051 (1999) for a richer discussion of this debate and the defini-
tion that follows.  
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resemble a pyramid, and according to some scholars, our Consti-
tution demands it.98 Executive hierarchy is the governing prin-
ciple of this framework, as best exemplified by Justice Scalia’s 
dissent in Morrison.99 
As these advocates see it, because Article II provides that 
the chief executive must see that the laws are faithfully exe-
cuted, the President has the obligation to ensure that his orders 
are followed by his chosen high-level officials.100 These scholars 
and advocates view the President, given his role as the nation-
ally elected official head of the federal government, as possessing 
tremendously broad supervisory, managerial, administrative, 
and enforcement powers over all administrative agencies.101 
Therefore, the President sits at the top of the executive pyramid 
and all administrative agencies must be subject to his control. 
Scholars, judges, and political leaders celebrate this approach for 
many reasons, one of which is that such an arrangement makes 
for efficient government. The chief executive can set coherent 
priorities, allocate limited resources, balance competing policy 
goals, and resolve both inter- and intra-agency conflicts effec-
tively and efficiently when he has complete corporate govern-
ance authority entrusted to him. 
But Supreme Court agency jurisprudence has largely re-
jected this approach, notwithstanding well-known critiques 
lauded by scholars and judges alike.102 Agency jurisprudence re-
lies (correctly) on valuing administrative competency, as exem-
plified in Humphrey’s. Contemporary accounts of the growth of 
the administrative state during the mid-1900s reinforce this 
view.103 But the theoretical underpinnings of administrative 
 
 98. See Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1377, 1378–86 (1994); Frank B. Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 
12,498: A Test Case in Presidential Control of Executive Agencies, 4 J.L. & POL. 
483, 499–504 (1988); Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presi-
dency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (1993); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agen-
cies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. 
REV. 573, 597–99, 643–50 (1984). 
 99. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). 
 100. Indeed, many scholars have long argued that Presidents were granted 
deliberately broad and persuasive mechanisms for executive branch control. See 
generally, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrisha B. Prakash, The President’s 
Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994). 
 101. See Strauss, supra note 98, at 609.  
 102. See generally id. 
 103. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 15 (1938); see 
also Stephen Breyer, Problems and Possibilities in the Administrative State—
Afterword, 92 YALE L.J. 1614, 1615–16 (1983). 
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competency, as seen in cases like Humphrey’s, were indeed 
slightly undermined over time as agencies branched out beyond 
their expertise to make decisions that “may properly belong in 
the political rather than the regulatory sphere.”104 Perhaps ho-
lacracy, not hierarchy, is the most effective framework for anal-
ysis.105 
Notwithstanding certain protestations, there is ample evi-
dence that the framers of the Constitution wanted to limit the 
President’s authority over various officials who would imple-
ment Congress’s laws.106 Historical accounts demonstrate that 
the power of presidential removal was not even discussed for-
mally at the constitutional convention.107 Presidents have re-
spected this “anti-removal” framework, more or less, since its in-
ception.108 Independent agencies exist for a reason—they do 
their best work supported by field experts, freed from political 
winds, and in specific tasks, functions, and industries that Con-
gress deems it appropriate to regulate. In recent times, perhaps 
there is such a thing as too much concentrated executive power. 
This is why it is important to remember that advocates of a uni-
fied executive framework operate theoretically, inasmuch as ev-
idence of the framers’ intent to create a hierarchical all-powerful 
executive is contradicted by much historical evidence. While a 
unified executive might be more efficient through the lens of the-
ory, “it cannot be disputed that the original understanding of the 
presidency called for much less presidential authority than is 
 
 104. See Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 407, 426 (1990). 
 105. Holacracy, the organizational structure adopted by Zappos and other 
organizations, allows for “distributed decision making while giving everyone the 
opportunity to work on what they do best.” See Jacob Morgan, The 5 Types of 
Organizational Structures: Part 5, Holacratic Organizations, FORBES (July 20, 
2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2015/07/20/the-5-types-of 
-organizational-structures-part-5-holacratic-organizations/#478fe5a548a2. An 
emphasis on distributed expert functions, with collaboration, produces better 
decision making without executive oversight. Id.; see also, e.g., Matthew T. 
Bodie, Holacracy in Corporate Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 619, 624 (2018). 
 106. See generally the extensive discussion in Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. 
Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994). 
 107. M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (1911); see 
also THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
 108. More recently—even as the “unified executive” model became more 
prominent within certain circles—Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan all re-
frained from including independent agencies within the scope of executive or-
ders concerned with using a cost/benefit analysis to shape regulatory policy. See 
Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982); Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 
§ 152 (1979); Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3 C.F.R. § 203 (1974). 
  
2448 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:2429 
 
taken for granted today.”109 Instead, as advocates of the CFPB 
see it, to be independent is to be mission-centered. And to be in-
dependent in this fractured political climate might be more im-
portant than ever. For all of the above reasons, the Supreme 
Court rightly set out the appropriate precedential framework in 
Humphrey’s. 
II.  VIEWING THE CFBP THROUGH THE PROPER LENS: 
HUMPHREY’S   
There has been only one Supreme Court decision in the 
eighty-four years preceding Free Enterprise holding a removal 
restriction to be unconstitutional and none that explicitly re-
jected an agency’s design as constitutionally defective. Thus, the 
design framework presented in Humphrey’s and molded over the 
last century has guided all of the prior Supreme Court decisions 
and is the essential component of any analysis.110 
The initial step in the Humphrey’s analysis, which looks at 
whether an agency’s removal structure is constitutional, is to de-
termine the nature of the core functions that the agency per-
forms.111 In instances where the activity is wholly executive in 
nature, Humphrey’s and Myers agree that the executive power of 
removal—inherent in the appointment power—cannot be inhib-
ited.112 Further, if the activities are considered quasi-legislative 
or quasi-judicial, a just-cause provision qualifying the presiden-
tial removal power comports with the Constitution.113 As other 
cases following Humphrey’s have shown, even without an ex-
plicit provision disallowing removal for political disagreement, 
the principle is deemed implicit.114 Thus, when dealing with an 
independent agency engaged in activities outside the executive 
 
 109. Cass R. Sunstein, An Eighteenth Century Presidency in a Twenty-First 
Century World, 48 ARK. L. REV. 1, 3 (1995). 
 110. Indeed, Humphrey’s is cited on the first page of the PHH-2 decision, 
even prior to the introduction. See PHH-2, No. 15-177, slip op. at 5 (D.C. Cir. 
Jan. 31, 2018) (en banc); see also Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstruct-
ing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 
778 (2013) (noting that the constitutional status of independent agencies stems 
from Humphrey’s); Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 
41, 94 (1986) (noting Humphrey’s has been viewed as the fundamental consti-
tutional charter of the independent regulatory commissions). 
 111. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 618–32 (1935). 
 112. Id. at 618–32; Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106–08 (1926). 
 113. Myers, 272 U.S. at 135. 
 114. See, e.g., Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1398 (D.D.C. 1986), 
aff ’d, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (noting that Humphrey’s “sought to provide whole-
sale . . . protection against political intervention”). 
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sphere, legislation can prevent the President from utilizing at-
will removal power. 
In addition to the nature of the activities performed, the 
court in Humphrey’s reasoned that in order for an independent 
agency to comfortably fit within a separation of powers frame-
work, that agency must be nonpartisan and possess some unique 
expertise in the area.115 Considering this, the Humphrey’s anal-
ysis can be further broken down into four component questions. 
Does the agency have a prevailing political ideology or partisan 
leaning? Does the agency possess a particular expertise or 
knowledge regarding the subject matter under the purview of 
the agency? Does the agency perform legislative responsibilities? 
And does the agency perform judicial duties?116 Answering these 
four questions should determine whether the agency’s “inde-
pendent” design is constitutional and whether such structure 
may impermissibly constrain removal power.117 
A. THE CFPB AS AN INDEPENDENT, NONPARTISAN, EXPERT, 
QUASI-LEGISLATIVE, QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY 
The CFPB is entrusted with an extensive set of duties that—
in its different capacities—touch not only executive activity, but 
legislative and judicial ones as well.118 Executive duties are 
those which further the executive’s responsibility to see that the 
law is faithfully executed, and include law enforcement roles.119 
Legislative responsibility is rule- or law-making power.120 The 
judiciary’s duty is to resolve disputes.121 The CFPB’s responsibil-
ities include creating and enforcing rules for financial institu-
tions, examining bank activity, overseeing financial product and 
service creation, monitoring American markets, and receiving, 
 
 115. Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 624. 
 116. See id. at 618–35. 
 117. See id. While these four components must be considered to satisfy the 
Humphrey’s analysis, their consideration only represents the initial method 
used by the Supreme Court to determine whether an agency is constitutionally 
independent from the executive. Throughout the last fifty years, the Court has 
used different cases to extend or transform that analysis, depending on other 
factors discussed infra. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting, 561 U.S. 477, 
483–92 (2010); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 672–75 (1988); Bowsher v. 
Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 717–24 (1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120–29 (1976). 
 118. The CFPB engages in law enforcement duties, law making duties, and 
conflict resolution duties. See About Us: The Bureau, CFPB, http://www 
.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau (last visited April 14, 2019). 
 119. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106–08 (1926). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
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resolving, and analyzing consumer complaints.122 These duties 
define the CFPB’s nature, and encompass all three branches of 
the federal government. It is therefore not merely an executive 
agency, but an independent quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial 
body.123 In order to determine if the removal structure of the 
CFPB is constitutional, these characteristics must be consid-
ered. 
1. Nonpartisan 
One of the main pillars of Humphrey’s is that an independ-
ent commission must be designed to be nonpartisan and free 
from political or branch influence.124 This serves as a way to en-
sure its actions are neutral and objective.125 The CFPB, situated 
within the Federal Reserve (itself an insulated, nonpartisan 
body), is largely independent from both the executive and legis-
lative branches. Whereas Congress is typically responsible for 
budget appropriations and allocation, the CFPB largely operates 
outside of those controls.126 Similarly, because of the just-cause 
provision regarding presidential removal, the CFPB director is 
free of coercive influence from the executive branch. Because the 
CFPB is largely an independent creature operating outside the 
direct control of Congress or the President, it comports with the 
first requirement of the Humphrey’s four-part analysis. 
But, various commentators still imply that the CFPB is par-
tisan, with a clear ideological line dividing its perceived support 
from Democrats and detractions by Republicans.127 Although the 
CFPB may seem partisan because of the ideological divide in 
support from members of Congress, the relative enthusiasm of 
 
 122. About Us: The Bureau, supra note 118. 
 123. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 618–32 (1935) (dis-
cussing characteristics of agencies that act with quasi-legislative and quasi-ju-
dicial duties). 
 124. See id. at 624; see also Daniel A. Crane, Debunking Humphrey’s Exec-
utor, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1835, 1837 (2015) (arguing that the assumptions 
about the FTC in Humphrey’s are no longer true). 
 125. Crane, supra note 124, at 1852. 
 126. 12 U.S.C. § 5497 (2012). But see Press Release, Fin. Servs. Comm., 
CFPB Lacks Oversight and Accountability (June 18, 2013), https://web.archive 
.org/web/20170516101416/http://financialservices.house.gov/news/ 
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=339512 (critiquing this structure). 
 127. Michael Hiltzik, Consumer Protection: Why Do Republicans Hate the 
CFPB So Much?, L.A. TIMES (July 23, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/ 
hiltzik/la-fi-mh-cfpb-republicans-20150723-column.html. But if regulating con-
sumer finance is inherently ideological, why isn’t regulating “trade” or “com-
merce,” or being a member of the Federal Reserve system also inherently ideo-
logical? 
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the major parties for the agency’s mission is not the type of par-
tisan behavior intended to be considered in the Humphrey’s anal-
ysis.128 Prior to the recent ascension of Director Mulvaney, Re-
publicans denounced the CFPB as a “runaway agency” and 
advocated its abolishment,129 but the Bureau itself is isolated 
from influence and does not reflect a material ideological bias in 
its function.130 The rules and requirements prescribed by the 
CFPB are not inherently more favorable to a particular ideolog-
ical lean, but rather are aimed at providing financial protection 
to all consumers without regard to party affiliation or region.131 
The disputes resolved and remedies provided do not favor a par-
tisan bias, but reflect a concern for consumers as an undivided 
group.132 This fact, in addition to the agency’s separation from 
both congressional appropriation review and executive at-will 
removal, satisfies the objectivity requirements of Humphrey’s 
and confirms the CFPB as an independent, nonpartisan body.133 
Humphrey’s next requires an inquiry into the expertise associ-
ated with the agency.134 
 
 128. See Crane, supra note 124, at 1843–46 (noting that nonpartisan behav-
ior is evaluated in light of political decisional modes). 
 129. Hiltzik, supra note 127. 
 130. But see Phil Hall, Study Shows CFPB Staff Donations Aimed at Demo-
cratic Candidates, NAT’L MORTGAGE PROF. MAG. (Nov. 28, 2017), https:// 
nationalmortgageprofessional.com/news/65240/study-shows-cfpb-staff 
-donations-aimed-democratic-candidates (suggesting CFPB employees contrib-
ute more to Democrats than Republicans). However, the data from this report 
is very misleading. Because of recurring low-dollar contributions, individuals 
appear multiple times in the database. For example, a random sample of the 
first 200 entries shows that two CFPB employees accounted for eight percent of 
the entire span of contributions since the CFPB’s inception. Given the sheer vol-
ume of employees (a yearly average of roughly 1300, not including turnover), 
this does not appear to be persuasive evidence of the entire Bureau’s political 
lean. 
 131. Indeed, the CFPB’s most recent three-year state-by-state accounting of 
consumer complaint volume identifies a political rainbow in the top five by vol-
ume: California, Florida, Texas, New York, and Georgia. See CFPB, COMPLAINT 
SNAPSHOT: 50 STATE REPORT 2 (2018), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
documents/6867/bcfp_50-state-report_complaint-snapshot_2018-10.pdf. 
 132. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE 
LENDING, http://www.responsiblelending.org/consumer-fin-protection-agency 
(last visited April 14, 2019) (noting initiatives directed to military members and 
their families, older Americans, and equal access to credit initiatives). 
 133. See Crane, supra note 124, at 1852 (discussing the detached, objective, 
non-partisan requirement of Humphrey’s). 
 134. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624 (1935). 
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2. Unique Expertise 
The second principle of Humphrey’s requires that an inde-
pendent agency be engaged in work in which it has unique ex-
pertise.135 For expertise to justify independence from the execu-
tive power of removal, the effectiveness of an independent 
agency in its outside position must be compared to its potential 
effectiveness were it situated wholly within the executive 
branch.136 The unique expertise analysis assumes that the best 
and brightest minds will be more likely to assist with independ-
ent agency work as opposed to executive agency work. Should 
this assumption not be sound, and the expertise advantage not 
actually materialize, it would weigh against finding that the 
agency’s work qualifies it for treatment as an independent 
agency that may constitutionally operate without its director be-
ing subject to at-will presidential removal power.137 
With the brief history of the CFPB, there are not many 
names to consider when addressing leadership expertise, or the 
agreed upon definition of what the Supreme Court thinks “ex-
pertise” means.138 Some suggest that expertise is a function of 
longevity in a narrow bureaucratic space, focused upon a partic-
ular industry or task over time.139 Thus, long-lasting presence at 
an agency, coupled with low employee turnover, standing alone, 
might constitute expertise. But, a narrow reading of Humphrey’s 
suggests the Court originally viewed the “experts” as the com-
missioners themselves, who would accumulate focused bureau-
cratic expertise over time due to their insulation from executive 
influence.140 Another view is that, with respect to specialized 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. Crane, supra note 124, at 1857. 
 137. Id. at 1856. 
 138. Before Richard Cordray became the first official Director of the CFPB, 
the agency was initially led by Elizabeth Warren, its creator, and later Raj Date, 
in the role of special advisor for the CFPB. See Daniel Bush, What Is the Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau, Anyway?, PBS (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www 
.pbs.org/newshour/economy/making-sense/what-is-the-consumer-financial 
-protection-bureau-anyway. 
 139. See, e.g., Datla & Revesz, supra note 110, at 777 (indicating long term 
employment and narrow subject areas for work correlate with “impartial exper-
tise”). 
 140. See Humphrey’s, 295 U.S. at 624 (quoting, with approval, Senate testi-
mony that “[i]t is manifestly desirable that the terms of the commissioners shall 
be long enough to give them an opportunity to acquire the expertness”); see also 
Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 395, 434 (1995) (“The Court viewed Humphrey as an ‘ex-
pert’ . . . .”). 
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agencies, expertise can be associated with avoidance of industry 
capture.141 In that sense, the CFPB’s leadership is largely con-
sistent with that goal, with few having served in leadership ca-
pacities at the CFPB’s regulated entities. Yet another formula-
tion means that employees enter with, or are expected to acquire, 
a specialized professional skill or set of industry-specific in-
sights.142 In short, both the legal and functional meaning of bu-
reaucratic expertise is uncertain.143 Here, focusing on two of the 
aforementioned understandings of expertise—director-level ex-
pertise and staff-level expertise—suggests some divergence 
from, yet consistency with, the Humphrey’s framework. 
First, so far as “expertise” is intended to refer to the Direc-
tor, the application of Humphrey’s is not without challenge. The 
CFPB’s first Director, Richard Cordray, was previously a Mar-
shall Scholar at the University of Oxford and editor-in-chief of 
the University of Chicago Law Review.144 Specific to consumer 
protection, Cordray, in his role as Ohio’s Attorney General, re-
covered over two billion dollars for his constituents and gained 
valuable experience and expertise regarding the adjudication 
and handling of consumer complaints.145 Although he has an im-
pressive résumé,146 it is debatable whether his edge in that spe-
cific area is enough to qualify him as a unique expert on the sub-
ject matter of the CFPB. Next, Director Mulvaney had 
significant expertise as well,147 though his approach to regula-
tion and enforcement strongly differed from that of Director 
 
 141. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through In-
stitutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 27 (2010). 
 142. See id. at 47–48 (discussing mandatory qualifications for certain agency 
roles, such as the requirement that the PCAOB have at least two certified public 
accountants or that the majority of the Surface Transportation Board have pro-
fessional backgrounds in transportation). 
 143. For a much more comprehensive exegesis, see Michael E. Levine, Revi-
sionism Revised? Airline Deregulation and the Public Interest, 44 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 179 (1981). 
 144. Press Release, The White House, President Obama Announces Richard 
Cordray As Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (July 17, 
2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/07/17/ 
president-obama-announces-richard-cordray-director-consumer-financial-pr. 
 145. Aaron Marshall, Wall Street Businesses Have Returned Money to Ohio, 
But Richard Cordray Overstates the Total, POLITIFACT (July 26, 2010), https:// 
www.politifact.com/ohio/statements/2010/jul/26/richard-cordray/wall-street 
-businesses-have-returned-money-ohio-ri. 
 146. See Press Release, The White House, supra note 144. 
 147. Mick Mulvaney, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/people/ 
mick-mulvaney (last visited April 14, 2019) (noting that Mulvaney graduated 
from Georgetown University with honors, attended law school at the University 
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Cordray. Perhaps he is not quite a “unique expert” either, given 
that he has not previously worked in a “consumer protection” or 
banking-related regulatory body or agency. And yes, the CFPB’s 
most recently confirmed director, Kathleen Kraninger, was cri-
tiqued for her lack of expertise in consumer protection.148 
Nonetheless, given the size of the Bureau, it is reasonable to 
assume that the unique expertise cited in Humphrey’s could ex-
tend to the senior and line-staff, not merely the Director. In 
short, even if the Director is a partisan appointment, “[c]areer 
staff supply the agency expertise.”149 Here, it appears that the 
CFPB’s senior and junior staff are uniquely expert by any con-
ventional measure, many having served in prior academic, en-
forcement, supervision, rule-making, or advising roles centered 
squarely in the CFPB’s regulatory space.150 So while there may 
 
of North Carolina on a full academic scholarship, and opened his own law firm). 
 148. See, e.g., Emily Stewart, The Senate Just Confirmed a Director for 
CFPB Who Has No Background in Consumer Issues, VOX (Dec. 6, 2018), https:// 
www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/12/6/18127487/kathy-kraninger-cfpb 
-mick-mulvaney. 
 149. See Jim Wedeking, The Ozone Rule That Wasn’t: How EPA Makes De-
cisions, A.B.A. (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
environment_energy_resources/publications/trends/2011_12/january_february/ 
ozone_rule_that_wasnt_how_epa_makes_decisions (noting that while EPA ad-
ministrators have not always had scientific credentials, career staff supply the 
agency expertise). 
 150. One methodology for assessing leadership expertise is to examine the 
qualifications of a number of senior members of any given division or depart-
ment. To that end, the head of CFPB’s Supervision Policy, Peggy Twohig, was 
previously Director of the Office of Consumer Protection at the Department of 
the Treasury. Peggy L. Twohig Biography, PRAC. L. INST., https://www.pli.edu/ 
Content/Faculty/Peggy_L_Twohig_/_/N-4oZ1z12d0o?ID=PE985835 (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2019). The CFPB’s head of Research, Markets & Regulations, Tom 
Pahl, spent fifteen years at the FTC and served briefly as the FTC’s chief Con-
sumer Protection Officer. Stephanie Eidelman, Tom Pahl Returns to CFPB, Will 
Oversee Debt Collection Rulemaking at Critical Juncture, INSIDEARM (Apr. 19, 
2018), https://www.insidearm.com/news/00043907-tom-pahl-returns-cfpb-will 
-oversee-debt-c. The Bureau’s head of enforcement, Kristen Donoghue, previ-
ously had roles as enforcement attorney, assistant litigation deputy in the office 
of enforcement, assistant deputy director for policy and strategy in the office of 
enforcement, deputy enforcement director, and finally principal deputy enforce-
ment director. Ben Lane, CFPB Promoting Kristen Donoghue to Be New Head 
of Enforcement, HOUSINGWIRE (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.housingwire.com/ 
articles/41768-cfpb-promoting-kristen-donoghue-to-be-new-head-of 
-enforcement. The CFPB’s Fair Lending director, Patrice Ficklin, charged with 
ensuring fairness in mortgage markets, among others, previously served as As-
sociate General Counsel at Fannie Mae during the mortgage crisis. Press Re-
lease, CFPB, Treasury Department Announces Senior Leadership Hires for the 
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not be a clearly discernable methodology for establishing “exper-
tise,” the CFPB’s staff should easily pass muster.151 However, in 
the absence of clarity about how each of these components should 
be weighed, and even if the unique expertise was not fully dis-
cernible, not all four Humphrey’s components should be required 
to justify an agency’s status as constitutionally independent. 
3. Wholly Executive Functions 
The third component of the Humphrey’s quartet requires de-
termining the degree to which the agency performs non-execu-
tive functions. The more prevalent such functions are, the more 
likely its constitutional basis.152 Agencies that are quasi-legisla-
tive are not subject to unrestrained presidential removal power 
due to separation of powers principles.153 The ability to make 
laws and rules is clearly legislative; and when possessed by an 
agency, this ability clearly extends its functions beyond a purely 
executive scope.154 However, there is a distinction between mere 
procedural rules and those that have substantive effect.155 The 
CFPB has significant, substantive rule-making power.156 
The quasi-legislative nature of the CFPB is found in its his-
tory of writing rules, which is functionally a legislative act.157 
For example, in response to the heightened levels of payment 
delinquency and foreclosure that occurred after the 2008 hous-
ing crisis, the CFPB enacted the “Ability-to-Repay” rule intended 
to protect consumers from aggressive mortgage lending.158 Other 
 
its former head of Research, Sendhil Mullainathan, received a MacArthur “Ge-
nius” award. Id. These qualifications and many others suggest a uniquely ex-
pert team dedicated to consumer financial protection. 
 151. Crane, supra note 124, suggests that another method would be to com-
pare the line staff expertise to staff expertise at a similarly situated purely ex-
ecutive agency, which could be, in this case, the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency. See id. at 1856–59. If the staff at the CFPB were not objectively “more 
expert,” this would, as Crane argues, undermine the case for valuing independ-
ence. See id. 
 152. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 618–34 (1935); Crane, 
supra note 124, at 1836–37. 
 153. Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 618–34. 
 154. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106–08 (1926). 
 155. Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 618–32. 
 156. See Susan Dudley, Is the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Un-
constitutional?, FORBES (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
susandudley/2016/04/15/is-the-consumer-financial-protection-bureau 
-unconstitutional/#ef38ed651b39. 
 157. Id.; see also Myers, 272 U.S. at 106–08. 
 158. Ability to Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in 
Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6407, 6407–09 (Jan. 30, 2013).   
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provisions added protections for consumers against other “abu-
sive” terms and products offered by lenders, clarified consumer 
disclosure laws, and attempted to outlaw arbitration clauses in 
certain consumer contracts.159 When the CFPB is acting in this 
law-making capacity, it is not performing an executive duty 
within the authority of the President, but accomplishing a legis-
lative task more akin to Congress’s work. While sporadic legis-
lative activity is not sufficient to deem the agency quasi-legisla-
tive,160 given the pervasive rule-making powers held and used by 
the CFPB, it is proper to classify the CFPB as quasi-legislative. 
It thus meets the third criterion of Humphrey’s four-part test for 
determining whether an agency can constitutionally operate in-
dependent from unrestrained executive authority. 
4. Quasi-Judicial Responsibilities 
The final component of Humphrey’s mirrors the third and 
asks whether the agency has quasi-judicial responsibilities.161 If 
its duties encompass substantial adjudicatory functions, the of-
fice cannot be said to be purely executive in nature.162 The CFPB 
is responsible for consumer complaints and often resolves those 
disputes in a judicial fashion.163 By adjudicating disputes, levy-
ing penalties, and awarding relief, the CFPB is acting as a quasi-
judicial body. The underlying enforcement matter in PHH is ob-
viously one such example, notwithstanding its disputed inter-
pretation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act.164 
Similar to an agency’s use of legislative powers, arguments 
have been made that judicial power, if not actually used, should 
not make an agency quasi-judicial.165 This argument is not ap-
plicable to the CFPB though, which has historically, even ag-
gressively, used these powers.166 It has fined financial institu-
tions that violated its rules, and awarded relief to aggrieved 
consumer parties.167 Considering this clear and substantive ad-
judicatory activity, the CFPB should also be considered a quasi-
 
 159. Id. at 6413, 6419. 
 160. See Dudley, supra note 156. 
 161. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 618–33 (1935); Crane, 
supra note 124, at 1835–36. 
 162. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 106, 106–10 (1926). 
 163. See About Us: The Bureau, supra note 118. 
 164. See PHH-2, No. 15-177, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Jan. 31, 2018) (en banc). 
 165. See Crane, supra note 124, at 1863–68. 
 166. The CFPB and its Director are actively involved in the adjudication of 
disputes, and do not merely possess such a power in theoretical terms. 
 167. About Us: The Bureau, supra note 118. 
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judicial body. This designation allows the CFPB to meet the 
fourth and final Humphrey’s prong for identifying a constitution-
ally sound independent agency. 
Having considered all four elements of Humphrey’s, it ap-
pears that the CFPB very likely meets at least three of the crite-
ria and possibly all four. The CFPB operates free from direct re-
liance on or influence by Congress or the executive branch.168 In 
its rule-making duties, the CFPB exhibits undeniable legislative 
traits and thus the agency should be considered quasi-legisla-
tive. Similarly, its adjudicatory responsibilities are judicial in 
nature and should qualify the Bureau as quasi-judicial. Alt-
hough the necessity of the independence of the CFPB from the 
executive branch as a means of attracting and retaining the best 
subject matter experts is uncertain, not clearly meeting one of 
the four components should not be fatal to the agency’s justifica-
tion of its constitutionally validated status, given that there is 
no precedent that suggests that meeting all four components is 
required. Thus, on balance, the CFPB is constitutional under the 
Humphrey’s analysis.169 
B. THE CFPB DIRECTOR AS A PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER 
There could, in theory, be additional reasons to question the 
CFPB’s constitutionality under the “Principal-Inferior Officer” 
analysis engaged by Morrison170 and its progeny, including Free 
Enterprise.171 However, nobody would seriously consider the Di-
rector of the CFPB to be an inferior officer and for that reason 
protected from removal. To determine whether an officer was 
principal or inferior, the Morrison Court offered three criteria to 
 
 168. This is less true when its current Director occupies a formal role within 
the Executive Branch, as was true for a time in the Trump Administration. 
 169. A separate analysis focused on the Supreme Court’s “blending” dicta 
would yield the same conclusion. See Justice Holmes’s opinions in Meyers v. 
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 88 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting) and Springer v. 
Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting), where he 
referenced “spider’s webs” and shaded penumbras to characterize the lack of 
strong constitutional separation of powers provisions. Similarly, in Buckley v. 
Valeo, the Court said that the Constitution does not require a “hermetic sealing 
off of the three branches of government,” 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976), and noted in 
Mistretta v. United States that it expects “that the coordinate Branches will con-
verse with each other on matters of vital common interest.” 488 U.S. 361, 408 
(1989). For these reasons and others, many administrative law scholars also 
argue against a rigid unitary actor approach to separation of powers issues.  
 170. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 171. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 
(2010). 
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consider. Under the Appointments Clause, an inferior officer: (1) 
is subject to removal by a higher executive branch official; (2) is 
empowered by the Act to perform only limited, certain duties; 
and (3) holds an office that is limited in jurisdiction and limited 
in tenure.172 If an agency head meets all three criteria, she is an 
inferior officer. If she fails any of the three criteria, she is a prin-
cipal officer.173 
Analyzing the CFPB under the Morrison standard confirms 
that the director is a principal officer. The director is not subject 
to removal at will by any individual, and is subject only to the 
President’s removal for good cause.174 Without having a superior 
officer who is able to remove the director, it cannot be said that 
she is subject to removal by a higher executive branch official.175 
The duties that the director performs are varied and numerous. 
As opposed to the limited duties of an inferior officer, the director 
engages in conduct that spans all three branches. In addition, 
the position’s tenure lasts beyond a single presidential cycle and 
its jurisdiction regarding consumer protection is vast. Accord-
ingly, since the director does not meet any of the three prongs, it 
is evident that the CFPB is headed by a principal officer as de-
fined by the Appointments Clause. Because of this, when consid-
ering the inferior/principal officer distinction in Morrison, the 
CFPB’s Director, though a principal officer, is not constitution-
ally required to be removable at will by the President so long as 
whatever removal power still remaining vests with the Presi-
dent.176 Finally, the Court made clear in Morrison that despite 
the exercise of discretion by the Independent Counsel, “we 
simply do not see how the President’s need to control the exercise 
of that discretion is so central to the functioning of the Executive 
Branch as to require as a matter of constitutional law that the 
counsel be terminable at will by the President.”177 To support 
that proposition, it cited the similar restrictions on removal 
 
 172. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 672–75. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Under Morrison, failing a single prong requires that the officer be 
deemed principal. Id. 
 175. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671–72. 
 176. In fact, Congress has also been deferential to presidential power even 
within the administrative agency regime structure. With respect to the FTC, for 
example, almost forty years after the FTC’s enabling Act, Congress saw fit to 
expand presidential control. The President is now allowed to name the Chair-
man from among sitting commissioners and the Chairman has increased pow-
ers. Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1950, 64 Stat. 1264 (1950). Similarly, Congress 
gave the CFPB broad authority in its regulated space.  
 177. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691–92.  
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power in the authorizing statute of the FTC; these exact same 
restrictions exist with respect to the CFPB.178 The lack of ability 
to unilaterally remove the head of the CFPB, given the alterna-
tive means of removal and other methods of executive influence, 
does not significantly deprive the President of his or her ability 
to take care that the law be faithfully executed. 
III.  ALT-HUMPHREY’S—ACTIVIST JUDGES ATTEMPT TO 
OVERCOME THE HUMPHREY’S-HUMP   
Because Humphrey’s, standing alone, should be sufficient 
precedent to find the Bureau constitutional, it is tempting to end 
the analysis here. However, a growing body of scholars, lawyers, 
judges, and now Supreme Court Justices, seems to suggest that 
the Supreme Court should either overrule Humphrey’s or that 
the CFPB’s structure is so fundamentally different from that 
contemplated in Humphrey’s that it warrants especially close 
scrutiny for a host of other reasons. The D.C. Circuit’s opinions 
in PHH-1 and PHH-2 and the growing body of courts using them 
as precedent suggest the sort of inter-circuit conflict that will 
merit Supreme Court review. And, while PHH-2 provides ample 
persuasive reasoning that the CFPB sits on firm constitutional 
ground pursuant to Humphrey’s and other factors, it is useful to 
reflect more broadly on the flawed PHH-1 arguments lest they 
continue to persuade or influence courts moving forward. To en-
gage this argument and explore its fallacies, one must also focus 
on its many assumptions and unusual persuasive techniques. 
In PHH-1, the panel refused to adhere to the historical prec-
edent set in Humphrey’s and instead quasi-embraced the reason-
ing—or perhaps the quiet aspirational spirit—of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Free Enterprise.179 In doing so, the PHH-1 
court determined that the structure of the CFPB is unconstitu-
tional because it is an extremely powerful independent agency 
headed by a single individual outside of the President’s direct 
 
 178. There are plenty who view Morrison as no longer favored by the Court. 
And, within a unified executive framework, it is true that the Court’s view re-
garding the unique above-the-law nature of the Independent Counsel would de-
serve to be fully re-examined if the Independent Counsel statute still existed. 
See Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A Formalistic Perspective on Why the 
Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 314–17 (1989). It may be inconsistent 
to find, on the one hand, that the President has the power to control the Execu-
tive Branch with wide discretion (including over termination) but not revisit 
whether the President has the power to terminate, say, the Director of the 
CFPB. 
 179. See PHH-1, No. 15-1177, slip op. at 9–10 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 11, 2016). 
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chain-of-command and that its current structure “threatens in-
dividual liberty.”180 It is no surprise that the decision in PHH-1, 
while still vaguely referencing the standards developed in most 
of the aforementioned cases, focused intensely on invoking unu-
sual arguments about how the CFPB’s design features threaten 
liberty and violate historic commission membership norms ra-
ther than performing a more case-centric analysis.181 
A.  SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE CFPB AND THE FTC 
But first, a reminder. The Myers and Humphrey’s frame-
works for determining the constitutionality of a removal provi-
sion of an independent agency head have been the guiding prec-
edent for eighty-three years. As such, independent agencies may 
be consistently upheld as constitutional under Humphrey’s.182 
Similar to the CFPB, the FTC has been generally considered an 
agency with multiple functions that slice across all three 
branches of the federal government. It serves as a quasi-legisla-
tive body with regard to rulemaking. It serves as a quasi-judicial 
body through its administrative judges and hearings. It serves 
as a quasi-executive body through civil enforcement mechanisms 
in the courts. Like the CFPB’s enabling statute, the FTC Act ex-
tensively discussed Congress’s goal of ensuring that the Com-
mission would remain independent and nonpartisan.183 The Sen-
ate Committee report explained that the Commission was being 
created, in part, to replace an existing executive branch office. 
The advantage of replacing that office, the Committee noted, was 
that the FTC could then be free from partisanship and exercise 
its independence from the President.184 The Committee report’s 
appendix quotes the bill’s chief sponsor’s description of the pro-
posed Commission as “independent of executive authority, ex-
cept in its selection, and independent in character.”185 The House 
Committee report similarly emphasized the FTC’s independence 
when it noted “the bill removes entirely from the control of the 
President and the Secretary of Commerce the investigations con-
ducted and the information acquired by the commission.”186 
 
 180. Id. at 59. 
 181. See id. at 9–10. 
 182. All challenges to independent agencies using Myers and Humphrey’s 
analysis failed until Free Enterprise. 
 183. See S. REP. NO. 63-597, at 11 (1914). 
 184. Id.  
 185. Id. at 22.  
 186. H.R. REP. NO. 63-533, at 3 (1914). 
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When the Supreme Court revisited the legislative history, it 
came to the correct conclusion that the floor debates in favor of 
independence “were long and thorough and contain nothing to 
the contrary.”187 Because the FTC is so similar to the CFPB and 
because the legislative histories and purposes uniquely align, for 
the D.C. Circuit in PHH-1 to determine that the CFPB was un-
constitutional, it was forced to look elsewhere for precedent by 
suggesting that the CFPB’s singular director structure rendered 
it completely inapplicable to Humphrey’s on that basis alone.188 
And when applying Free Enterprise, the PHH-1 court took a nar-
row holding of a factually distinct case189 and applied dicta lib-
erally to circumvent preparing a thorough Humphrey’s analy-
sis—one which would have clearly forced it to acknowledge that 
the CFPB, like all but one challenged agency before it, was a 
valid independent agency able to constitutionally operate out-
side the direct control of the President. 
Much of the PHH-1 Court’s analysis focused on the CFPB’s 
perceived lack of accountability. But the CFPB may in fact be 
the most accountable executive agency—independent or other-
wise—in two key areas: transparency within the branches and 
accountability to its mission stakeholders (regulators and regu-
lated entities).190 
B. MEASURES ENSURING THE CFPB’S ACCOUNTABILITY 
With respect to inter-branch accountability, there are nu-
merous liberty-enhancing safeguards. The director must testify 
before Congress, twice a year, in both Houses.191 The CFPB must 
issue annual reports to congressional committees and the Presi-
dent, which require it to justify its expenses,192 its rulemak-
ing,193 and its enforcement and supervisory functions,194 and 
then discuss the prior year’s consumer complaints,195 financial 
 
 187. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625 (1935). 
 188. See PHH-1, No. 15-1177, slip op. at 9 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 11, 2016) (vacated). 
 189. See id. at 34, 41–44. 
 190. Advocates for the CFPB have recognized the importance of these pro-
tections and provided substantial insight for this analysis. See Accountability of 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CONSUMER FED’N AM., https:// 
consumerfed.org/pdfs/CFPB-Accountability-fact-sheet-6-11.pdf (last visited 
April 14, 2019). 
 191. 12 U.S.C. § 5496(a) (2012). 
 192. Id. § 5496(c)(2). 
 193. Id. § 5496(c)(3). 
 194. Id. § 5496(c)(5). 
 195. Id. § 5493(b)(3)(C). 
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literacy,196 and its monitoring efforts.197 The CFPB is subject to 
audit by the Comptroller General and the Government Account-
ability Office, and the Comptroller separately submits its audit 
to Congress and the President.198 The Bureau’s enforcement ac-
tions can be challenged in federal court,199 its rules are subject 
to the standard Administrative Procedure Act process,200 and it 
must submit quarterly spending reports to the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget.201 Congress can overturn the CFPB’s rules 
with legislation under the Congressional Review Act, and it has 
repeatedly done so.202 Should time grant it 20/20 hindsight, the 
CFPB can also later repeal its own quasi-legislative acts.203 Fur-
ther, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) can stay 
or set aside any rules that interfere with the “safety and sound-
ness” of the banking system.204 Pending an FSOC vote, the Sec-
retary of the Treasury is empowered, upon the request of any 
FSOC member, to stay the effective date of any Bureau rule.205 
With respect to accountability to stakeholders, there is a 
large number of statutory protections. The CFPB must consult 
with a dizzying array of federal regulators prior to proposing 
rules;206 incorporate regulators’ objections into the rulemaking 
 
 196. Id. § 5493(d)(4)(A)–(B). 
 197. Id. § 5512(c)(3)(A). 
 198. Id. § 5497(a)(5)(A)–(B). 
 199. Id. § 5563(b)(4). 
 200. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2012). 
 201. 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(4)(A). 
 202. See, e.g., H.J. Res. 111, 115th Cong. (2017) (rejecting the CFPB’s arbi-
tration rule); see also Press Release, CFPB, CFPB to Hold Auto Lenders Ac-
countable for Illegal Discriminatory Markup (Mar. 21, 2013), https://www 
.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection 
-bureau-to-hold-auto-lenders-accountable-for-illegal-discriminatory-markup 
(discussing its former guidance about fair lending and indirect auto lenders and 
noting the repeal of such guidance by Congress in May 2018). 
 203. See William Hoffman, CFPB to Reconsider or Repeal Auto Title Lending 
Rule, AUTO FIN. NEWS (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.autofinancenews.net/cfpb 
-to-reconsider-or-repeal-auto-title-lending-rule. 
 204. 12 U.S.C. § 5513(a). 
 205. Id. § 5513(c)(1)(A). 
 206. Id. § 5512(b)(2)(B) (“[T]he Bureau shall consult with the appropriate 
prudential regulators or other Federal agencies prior to proposing a rule and 
during the comment process regarding consistency with prudential, market, or 
systemic objectives administered by such agencies . . . .”); id. § 5531(e) (“In pre-
scribing rules under this section, the Bureau shall consult with the Federal 
banking agencies, or other Federal agencies, as appropriate, concerning the con-
sistency of the proposed rule with prudential, market, or systemic objectives 
administered by such agencies.”). 
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record;207 share examination data208 and complaints;209 conduct 
a cost benefit analysis for proposed rules;210 include the impact 
of such rules on small banks, credit unions, and rural consum-
ers;211 and contemplate the consequences of “unduly burdensome 
regulations.”212 It also must notify the Attorney General when 
commencing enforcement actions.213 It must consult with federal 
and state regulators to minimize the regulatory burden for large 
institutions.214 It must give small businesses previews of new 
proposals prior to the general public as well.215 It must reassess 
its rules, with required public comment, within five years of im-
plementation.216 Finally, it must submit its budget requests—a 
budget that is statutorily capped217—to the Federal Reserve 
even though it is funded separately from congressional appropri-
ations.218 The dizzying array of both inter-branch and public-fac-
ing accountability measures are real. As such, they render the 
CFPB’s critics’ hyperbole—such as the “director is in fact an-
swerable to no one[,] . . . not subject to any meaningful executive-
branch oversight [and] . . . insulated from . . . any real legislative 
oversight”219—downright comical, even alt-factual.  
C. PHH-1’S FLAWED RELIANCE ON HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF 
AGENCY STRUCTURE 
The PHH-1 court reasoned that, although the Supreme 
Court had never held that agencies headed by a single person 
could not be independent, historical evidence showed that inde-
 
 207. Id. § 5512(b)(2)(C). 
 208. Id. § 5512(c)(6)(C)(i). 
 209. Id. § 5493(b)(3)(A). 
 210. Id. § 5512(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 211. Id. § 5512(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
 212. Id. § 5511(b)(3). 
 213. Id. § 5564(d)(1). 
 214. Id. § 5515(b)(2). 
 215. Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 1100G, 124 Stat. 1955, 2112; Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fair-
ness Act of 1996, S. 942, 104th Cong. § 404 (1996). 
 216. 12 U.S.C. § 5512(d)(1)–(3). 
 217. Id. § 5497(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
 218. Id. § 5497(a)(1). 
 219. Brief of the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants-
Appellants at 4, CFPB v. All Am. Check Cashing, Inc., No. 18-60302 (5th Cir. 
July 9, 2018). That the CATO Institute can say “[t]he director is, uniquely in 
our government, accountable to literally no one” with a straight face demon-
strates the weakness of its—and others’—positions. See id. at 12. 
  
2464 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:2429 
 
pendent agencies are almost exclusively headed by multi-mem-
ber committees and that such historical precedent was rele-
vant.220 This “unitary director” structure, according to PHH-1, is 
not only extremely uncommon, but also more susceptible to cor-
ruption and arbitrary decision-making than a multi-member 
committee, and represents an amount of unilateral power offen-
sive to separation of powers principles.221 Referencing that his-
torical precedent vaguely and repeatedly, the court decided that 
the novelty of the structure of the CFPB—it being the only inde-
pendent agency wielding significant executive power while led 
by a single individual—weighed against it when considering its 
constitutionality.222 The court’s suggestion that Supreme Court 
dicta hinted that novelty might be a relevant factor was not 
new,223 but was also untethered from a robust analysis of the 
facts as applied to relevant law, most notably Humphrey’s. 
As the PHH-1 court saw it, there has never before been an 
independent agency headed by a single individual who possesses 
powers as significant as those vested in the CFPB. Further, its 
director is protected from removal by the President by a just-
cause provision, and without a multi-member committee, it is 
also allegedly free from any other legitimate check or balance—
threatening liberty as we know it.224 Whereas historically inde-
pendent agencies have been led by multi-member committees 
made up of colleagues who provided each other’s checks and bal-
ances, the Director of the CFPB is able to uniformly determine 
“what rules to issue; how to enforce, when to enforce, and against 
whom to enforce the law.”225 But the PHH-1 court’s rhetoric is 
particularly amusing given the many above-mentioned statutory 
provisions restricting the CFPB’s ability to issue rules, the tim-
ing of rules, and the various categories of entities that are not 
subject to its reach. 
The PHH-1 court also addressed the select few independent 
agencies that exist with an individual serving as the agency 
 
 220. PHH-1, No. 15-1177, slip op. at 36–38 (D.C. Cir. Oct 11, 2016) (vacated) 
(citing examples of invocations of history, but largely ignoring the Court’s 
agency cases). 
 221. Id. at 43–44. 
 222. Id. at 43 
 223. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: 
The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2139 
(2015). 
 224. PHH-1, slip op. at 23–26. 
 225. Id. at 7. 
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head, and reasoned that because all similar agencies were cre-
ated or reorganized recently, they suffer from the same constitu-
tional problems that the CFPB does—solely because they too 
lack established historical precedent.226 All of these independent 
offices or agencies—the recently revised Social Security Admin-
istration, the Office of Special Counsel, and the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency—were created after 1978, with the FHFA cre-
ated in 2008.227 In addition to the recent creation of these agen-
cies, the law enforcement and penalty assessing powers of the 
CFPB are absent from the Social Security Administration and 
the Office of Special Counsel.228 Thus, although there are rare 
examples of independent agencies headed by individuals, they 
are contemporary creations and they are fundamentally less 
powerful than the CFPB.229 
The PHH-1 court also used an unwieldy and ahistorical com-
bination of analysis from Free Enterprise to reason that novel 
agency structures are inherently constitutionally problematic 
due to a lack of precedent, and that when the constitutional text 
does not provide sufficient clarity, a long-standing established 
practice “is a consideration of great weight.”230 The structure of 
the CFPB deviated from the settled historical practice of having 
multi-member committees lead independent agencies.231 Be-
cause of its fundamental differences from the typical structure 
of an independent agency, coupled with its potential for arbi-
trary decisions that could threaten individual liberty, the court 
refused to extend the Humphrey’s precedent to the CFPB.232 But 
the PHH-1 court’s warped view of unchecked power threatening 
liberty assumed away the many checks and balances and ac-
countability mechanisms built into the CFPB. The PHH-1 court 
 
 226. Id. at 29–35. That said, many banking and financial regulatory frame-
works, while not “independent” from the executive in the Constitutional sense, 
do have single directors or more unitary hierarchies, such as the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, National 
Credit Union Association, and the Federal Reserve’s Division of Supervision 
and Regulation. And, many of these singular financial-regulator offices have 
existed longer than most independent agencies. Thus, one might conclude from 
these long-standing regulatory arrangements that, at least with respect to the 
financial sector, having a singular-regulator is more common than it might be 
for other regulated industries. 
 227. Id. at 29. The Independent Counsel statute was not renewed. Id. at 31. 
 228. Id. at 32 n.5. 
 229. Id. at 34. 
 230. See id. at 39–40. 
 231. Id. at 43. 
 232. Id. at 9–10. 
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may have invoked the specter of a liberty-squashing regulatory 
boogeyman, but the truth is, in fact, the opposite. 
D. PHH-1’S MISTAKES: IMPROPER APPLICATION OF FREE 
ENTERPRISE, AND OVEREMPHASIS ON “HISTORY” AND “LIBERTY” 
Ultimately, the PHH-1 court continued to pay lip service to 
Free Enterprise at the remedy stage, and concluded that alt-
hough the structure of the CFPB is unconstitutional in its cur-
rent format, the proper remedy was merely to strike the just-
cause provision, making the Director of the CFPB removable at 
will by the President and turning the CFPB into a traditional 
executive agency.233 In doing so, it refused to foist any substan-
tive change upon the CFPB’s operations or scope. The court rec-
ognized it had an alternative option, that is, instead of removing 
the just-cause provision and turning the CFPB into a traditional 
executive agency, it could have changed the single-director struc-
ture into a multi-member committee, turning the CFPB into a 
constitutionally acceptable independent agency.234 However, the 
court reasoned that such a change would involve more potential 
issues and create additional problems for the agency in the short 
term, and left such a decision up to Congress.235 In addition, the 
court cited recent precedent demonstrating that severing the 
problematic provision is the most common remedy for this type 
of constitutional ill.236 
With the PHH-1 opinion judicially dead (but still living as 
theory), an entirely new—but tenuous—critical framework has 
emerged. Rather than grounding their reasoning in Myers, 
Humphrey’s, and their progeny, courts and scholars instead 
choose to embrace more recent decisions and tether their rheto-
ric to a suspicion of the constitutional infirmity of novel struc-
tures, specifically the CFPB’s deviation from the tradition of 
multi-member committees heading independent agencies.237 In 
short, dicta and a cursory glance at Free Enterprise allow these 
 
 233. Id. at 69. 
 234. Id. at 68–69. The PHH-1 court, recognizing the application of Humph-
rey’s could not be completely ignored, seemed willing to suggest that a CFPB 
with five directors would be virtually identical in structure to the FTC, render-
ing it Constitutional. Id. Further, because the PHH-1 court equated design “nov-
elty” with suspect Constitutional footing, the change to a more historically-fa-
miliar design would remove one of that court’s key criteria for finding the CFPB 
unconstitutional. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 66–67. 
 237. See, e.g., id. at 8–9. 
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critics to reason that new and atypical agency structures are in-
herently constitutionally problematic.238 But Humphrey’s cannot 
be that easily ignored. 
The PHH-1 court cited Free Enterprise in order to avoid 
Humphrey’s, but failed to appreciate that the court in Free En-
terprise undertook an extensive Humphrey’s analysis—even be-
ginning its opinion by restating its agreement with Humphrey’s 
and noting “[we] held that Congress can, under certain circum-
stances, create independent agencies run by principal officers 
appointed by the President, whom the President may not remove 
at will but only for good cause.”239 The Free Enterprise Court de-
termined that under that analysis, the PCAOB removal struc-
ture prevented the President from faithfully executing the 
law.240 It did not simply state that because the two degrees of 
separation structure was new, it was unconstitutional, but ra-
ther it applied an Article II analysis, focusing on the “inferior 
officer” distinction, and only then determined that the removal 
provisions were unconstitutional.241 In addition, the Court in 
Free Enterprise did not hinge its decision on whether the agency 
was led by an individual or a multi-member committee. The only 
issue after having determined that the nature of the agency met 
the four criteria of Humphrey’s was whether the removal struc-
ture prevented the President from meeting his Article II respon-
sibilities.242 
Finally, the holding in Free Enterprise would seem to be in-
applicable to the CFPB because the agency removal structure 
and corresponding relationships involving the CFPB are funda-
 
 238. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 
505–06 (2010) (suggesting that a lack of historical precedent is a constitutional 
problem is a dangerous game). The road from Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 
(1896) to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), as with the journey 
from Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) to Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996) to Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), should remind us that 
referencing the norms of the past as a Constitutional status-quo baseline is not 
always the wisest approach to preserving individual liberty or upholding the 
Constitution. As Justice Scalia’s dissent in Romer reminds us, the Bowers court 
held that the Constitution did not ensure the right to “what virtually all States 
had [prohibited] from the founding of the Republic.” Romer, 517 U.S. at 640 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). The Taney court similarly referenced the “histories of 
the times” as a basis for denying Dred Scott his Constitutional rights. See Dred 
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856). 
 239. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 483. 
 240. Id. at 484. 
 241. See id. 
 242. Id. at 496. 
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mentally different from those of the PCAOB. Whereas the struc-
ture of the PCAOB prevented the President from having sub-
stantive input in the good-faith determination of cause, the 
CFPB’s structure and framework does no such thing. In Free En-
terprise, the President had no legitimate way to influence the de-
cision-making process and would have had his ability to perform 
his constitutional duties severely impacted by the SEC usurping 
his power.243 Conversely, the President determines whether 
there is just-cause to remove the Director of the CFPB. Because 
the President has direct input regarding the just-cause determi-
nation, he is able to effectively enforce the laws. To make the 
CFPB’s situation analogous to the PCAOB’s, the remaining re-
moval power in a CFPB challenge would have to vest in the Fed-
eral Reserve as only this would mirror the SEC’s control over the 
PCAOB. Although Free Enterprise has been a good development 
for Myers enthusiasts because it offers courts a potential Magi-
not Line for resisting congressional overreach and will likely con-
tinue to be invoked in future challenges to removal, the appro-
priateness of its application to the now-resolved PHH case and 
to future cases involving other dissimilar agencies seems tenu-
ous. Not all new or atypical structures are inherently unconstitu-
tional. The novelty issue is most salient when the structure stops 
the President from being able to faithfully execute his Article II 
powers.244 Whereas the design of the PCAOB’s removal process 
was convoluted and likely to burden the President, the single 
layer of good-cause restriction for the CFPB’s director also com-
ports with the other post-Humphrey’s independent agencies that 
have had their constitutionality upheld.245 
The holding of Free Enterprise was narrow because it main-
tained conformity with Humphrey’s and Myers—which is why 
the factual differences between the CFPB and the PCAOB are so 
critical. Whereas the President had no direct control over 
PCAOB board members, the President determines whether 
there is just cause to remove the Director of the CFPB. This abil-
ity to determine if cause exists has been consistently upheld un-
der Humphrey’s as sufficient for the President to meet his Article 
II responsibilities. The inability to meet these responsibilities 
under the two-degrees of separation structure was the ultimate 
 
 243. Id.; Bader, supra note 95, at 277. 
 244. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 484. 
 245. The CFPB operates with a single layer of just-cause removal separation 
from the President. The PCAOB in Free Enterprise had two layers of separation. 
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reason that the PCAOB was deemed unconstitutional, not be-
cause the agency’s structure was novel.246 To apply Free Enter-
prise differently is to distort its holding and its purpose. Had this 
been an issue of first impression with no set precedent to follow, 
the PHH-1 court’s reasoning might be sufficient. But with such 
a well-established framework already in place, it was the court’s 
role to thoroughly apply the law that the Supreme Court has re-
peatedly endorsed. That analysis must flow through Humph-
rey’s. 
Finally, the rhetorical flourish of the PHH-1 court (and the 
PHH-2 minority) is particularly concerning given its unwilling-
ness to engage precedent—and even other members of the court. 
The PHH-1 court invoked “history” seventy-eight times in its 
more than one hundred pages. It cited Free Enterprise forty-
eight times, more than it cited Humphrey’s, the foundational 
case in this line of jurisprudence. Similarly, the court invoked 
“liberty” fifty-three times—more than it cited or referenced My-
ers, Bowsher, Youngstown Steel, Buckley, and Mistretta com-
bined.247 The opinion’s references to “history” and “liberty” com-
bined eclipse its reference to all relevant case law, including Free 
Enterprise and Humphrey’s.248 Put differently, the court’s unu-
sually heavy reliance on historical analysis and abstract liberty 
principles obfuscated what it did not do: it did not directly en-
gage the Supreme Court’s 100 years of executive agency juris-
prudence. This was the recipe for a flawed analysis. 
The PHH-1 court simply gave too much persuasive impact 
to the theoretical value of a unitary executive. As a lower court 
accurately noted, “[t]he President is not required to execute the 
laws; he is required to take care they be executed faithfully.”249 
Perhaps Humphrey’s was not nearly as wide-ranging as some 
commentators suggest, which allowed the PHH-1 court to 
ground its analysis in a limited way. At the core of Humphrey’s, 
the Court held that the FTC acts in part quasi-legislatively and 
in part quasi-judicially, but that it “exercises no part of the exec-
utive power vested by the Constitution in the President.”250 
Based upon that demarcation of authority and responsibility, the 
 
 246. See id. 
 247. The court invoked “liberty” fifty-three times, compared to Myers (18), 
Bowsher (8), Youngstown (7), Buckley (4), and Mistretta (2). See PHH-1, No. 15-
1177, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Oct. 11, 2016) (vacated). 
 248. PHH-1 makes 131 references to history or liberty as compared to 128 
references to relevant case law. See id. 
 249. SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677, 682 (10th Cir. 1988). 
 250. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935). 
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Court found that the FTC’s executive functions at the time were 
largely incidental to the other core functions and that in any case 
the Commission did not exercise executive power “in the consti-
tutional sense”.251 The regulatory and political environment, and 
the FTC’s core functionality have changed since Humphrey’s. 
Perhaps the findings that the core functionality of the FTC was 
definitely non-executive was at least part of the basis for the 
Court’s decision in Humphrey’s, although it has never held that 
to be significant in its agency jurisprudence to date. But, until 
the Supreme Court says otherwise, the CFPB should be seen as 
independent from undue branch influence, nonpartisan, 
uniquely expert, and possessing quasi-judicial and legislative 
duties. Thus, it satisfies the criteria to constitutionally avoid the 
reach of unrestrained at-will presidential removal power.252 
E. WHY PHH-1 STILL MATTERS 
Although PHH-1 was reversed en banc, its primary author, 
Justice Kavanaugh, was not persuaded by the full court’s analy-
sis. The PHH-1 majority’s refusal to critically engage other 
points of view or the entirety of what became the PHH-2 major-
ity’s analysis suggests a deep intractability to the legal divide—
almost to the point of absurdity.253 The PHH-2 court correctly 
rejected the PHH-1 framework, restoring Humphrey’s to its 
rightful place in this jurisprudence. That said, other courts con-
tinue to consider these claims with varying levels of analysis, 
with some still relying on the now-withdrawn opinion from PHH-
1.254 Continued reference to PHH-1 is misguided; rhetorical ap-
peals to liberty and history are not sufficient to overcome the 
Supreme Court precedent that overwhelmingly favors the 
CFPB.255  
 
 251. Id. 
 252. See Crane, supra note 124. 
 253. The dissent in PHH-2 so intently refuses to engage its critics or the 
court’s majority that large parts of its analysis, in fact, most of it, is simply 
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 254. See supra note 19; see also CFPB v. RD Legal Funding, No. 17-CV-890 
(LAP) (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2018) (presently on appeal); CFPB v. D&D Mktg., No. 
2:15-CV-09692, 2016 WL 8849698, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2016), interlocutory 
appeal granted, No. 17-55709, 2017 WL 597428 (9th Cir. May 17, 2017) (includ-
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F. NEXT STEPS—MOVING TO A FIVE-MEMBER COMMISSION 
Much of PHH-1 centers around Justice Kavanaugh’s belief 
that the novelty of the director-structure is almost prima facie 
evidence of the CFPB’s unconstitutionality.256 As explained 
above, these arguments are simply inconsistent with the Su-
preme Court’s independent agency jurisprudence. Thus, while 
Justice Kavanaugh and ideological opponents of the CFPB may 
have been wrong on the constitutional issues, they were right on 
one point: the singular director structure is deficient. 
The singular director structure is deficient not because it is 
unconstitutional, but because it is undesirable, and its political 
costs outweigh its perceived administrative benefits. A singular 
director is more susceptible to insular decision-making, partisan 
influence, and abuse than a multi-member commission with a 
staggered membership and bipartisan appointment structure. In 
2011, congressional Republicans proposed a sensible multi-
member replacement, articulating various reasons for its greater 
likelihood of success: first, a commission with staggered terms 
provides greater leadership stability over time; and second, a 
commission structure promotes greater consistency in rule-mak-
ing and administration.257 Congressional Republicans presci-
ently argued that: 
[A] single director will set up a situation in which the leadership of the 
CFPB will be subject to the variances in ideology from one administra-
tion to another when the director is appointed. Consumers stand to lose 
the most if we have a situation in which the directorship of the CFPB 
swings back and forth between the extremes of the political spec-
trum.258 
But now that the political pendulum has swung toward the Re-
publican party and a Republican-appointed CFPB director sits 
in the chair, is it terribly surprising that its initial detractors 
 
(statement of James Madison) (noting that “there may be strong reasons why 
an officer [such as the Comptroller of the United States] should not hold his 
office at the pleasure of the Executive branch” if one of his “principal 
dut[ies] . . . partakes strongly of the judicial character”); see also Free Enter. 
Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 514–49 (2010) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 256. See PHH-1, No. 15-1177, slip op. at 29, (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 2016) (vacated) 
(“Prior to oral argument, in an effort to be comprehensive, the Court issued an 
order asking the CFPB for all historical or current examples it could find of 
independent agencies headed by a single person removable only for cause.”); see 
also id. at 64 (“[W]e therefore conclude that the CFPB is unconstitutionally 
structured because it is an independent agency headed by a single Director.”). 
 257. See 157 CONG. REC. 11,698 (2011) (statement of Rep. Capito). 
 258. Id. 
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now think the single-director structure is solidly constitu-
tional?259 
As we have seen in recent years, a singular director model 
can become effectively partisan. Visions that a singular director 
structure would yield more rapid and efficient lawmaking did 
not come to pass.260 And so, with a political turn-about and a 
singular director, it is to be expected that a partisan appoint-
ment by a new President could bring about “a chilled CFPB law 
enforcement program [that] will lead to a disempowered, less af-
fluent America.”261 In fact, enforcement actions steeply dropped 
during Director Mulvaney’s tenure; it remains too soon to deter-
mine whether his successor shares his enforcement approach.262 
But in this political climate, there may be a bipartisan op-
portunity to shift the singular director model to a multi-member 
model similar to other federal agencies. As the PHH-1 court 
noted, such a change is well within congressional power.263 If 
Congress were to replace the singular director position with a 
multi-member commission, the removal structure would no 
longer be atypical, and the agency could once again be recognized 
as independent—even by its critics. Such a distinction would al-
low the multi-member commission to operate more effectively 
generally, consistent with lessons also gleaned from business 
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Check Cashing, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-356-WHB-JCG (5th Cir. Sept. 10, 2018) (ar-
guing that its singular director structure is firmly constitutional). 
 260. See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. 6237 (2010) (statement of Sen. Whitehouse) 
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 261. Christopher L. Peterson, The Risk of an Anti-Consumer CFPB, DEMOC-
RACY (Dec. 21, 2017), https://democracyjournal.org/arguments/the-risk-of-an 
-anti-consumer-cfpb. 
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and social-science literature about better and more effective gov-
ernance structures.264 It would mitigate capture concerns, such 
as they exist, from both sides of the aisle.265 And, it would pre-
vent the long-term reign of a director opposed to the CFPB’s mis-
sion as interpreted by its advocates.266 Finally, of course, such a 
change fundamentally undercuts the logic in PHH-1, among 
other cases.267 Yes, ultimately the Supreme Court could also con-
stitutionally blue-pencil the removal clause to save the CFPB, 
but severing it would of course make the CFPB a completely po-
litical agency, something it was structured to entirely avoid. 
  CONCLUSION   
The stakes are high. Some of the CFPB’s most important 
actions are rooted in its executive independence and can fairly 
be seen as implementing a broad economic and racial equality 
framework for consumers, regardless of who holds our nation’s 
highest office.268 To the extent that the Bureau becomes merely 
an arm of the executive and subject to its whims, its nonpartisan 
focus and racial-equity impact will be substantially imperiled.269 
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That said, the constitutional death of the CFPB and other 
independent government agencies is greatly exaggerated, like 
Mark Twain’s first death.270 The Supreme Court has affirmed 
the constitutionality of independent agencies regularly since 
Humphrey’s. In the rare instances that it has not, only the of-
fending provision has been removed, while the remaining struc-
ture stayed valid. Though PHH-1 created a stir by avoiding prec-
edent and invoking rhetoric of history and novelty, the PHH-2 
court correctly identified the key issues and found the Bureau’s 
structure sound.271 When applying each piece of the constitu-
tional analysis under Humphrey’s and its progeny, the CFPB 
qualifies as the type of agency that is constitutionally able to 
function independently without unfettered presidential over-
sight. It is nonpartisan, uniquely expert, quasi-judicial, and 
quasi-legislative—removing it from the exclusive domain of the 
executive. The CFPB conforms to established requirements: it 
does not vest ultimate removal power in itself; it does not vest 
removal power in a third party other than the President; it is not 
protected from presidential oversight by more than one layer; it 
also does not burden the President’s ability to perform his or her 
constitutional duties to enforce the law. And, even in these par-
tisan times, the executive still acknowledges that its law enforce-
ment power does not extend over independent agencies.272 
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Vague threats against liberty are not enough to ignore a 
hundred years of agency solitude. When asked to invalidate a 
statutory provision “that has been approved by both Houses of 
the Congress and signed by the President, particularly an Act of 
Congress that confronts a deeply vexing national problem, [the 
Supreme Court] should only do so for the most compelling con-
stitutional reasons.”273 None are found here. 
If the Supreme Court were to find otherwise and permit 
even greater concentrations of presidential power over independ-
ent agencies, the President would certainly conform them to his 
political will as soon as possible after taking office. Such an un-
expected result would certainly surprise the original sponsors of 
the FTC Act, as well as those who created the CFPB. Just as was 
true with the FTC, the Supreme Court has long since settled the 
idea that “Congress did not wish to have hang over the Commis-
sion the Damocles’ sword of removal by the President for no rea-
son other than that he preferred to have on that Commission 
men of his own choosing.”274 To protect the CFPB’s legacy, and 
by extension, other independent agencies, scholars and judges 
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should reexamine their understanding of the consequences of re-
ifying a unitary-executive framework, and also square their cri-
tiques of the CFPB more thoroughly within the last century’s 
larger body of Supreme Court independent agency jurispru-
dence. 
Should any of the current CFPB cases reach the Supreme 
Court, as I expect one will, the Court should reaffirm its tradi-
tional Humphrey’s-centric agency analysis and determine that 
the CFPB is structurally constitutional, while rejecting the nov-
elty-as-unconstitutional approach. While the foundational cases 
will surely receive attention from the Court, the appeal may 
nonetheless turn on its evolving interpretation of Free Enterprise 
and its applicability to the CFPB. The CFPB’s structural simi-
larity to the agencies present in prior Supreme Court decisions 
that upheld removal restrictions will likely outweigh the tenu-
ous application of Free Enterprise to the CFPB as occurred in 
PHH-1. In its consideration of the CFPB’s constitutionality, the 
Supreme Court will have the opportunity to further define (1) 
the contours of the President’s removal power, (2) its process for 
identifying constitutionally permissible independent agency de-
sign structures, and (3) the proper role of Humphrey’s and its 
progeny. Through its grounded principles and application of 
precedent, the Court should find that the foundation of the 
CFPB, whether a five-person or one-person structure, is settled 
on firm constitutional ground. 
 
